Tuesday, July 31, 2012

WHY THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA NEEDS TO TEACH MRC SOME HISTORY…







WHY THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA NEEDS TO TEACH MRC SOME HISTORY…

DISCLAIMER- this is a very long post!

Last week, a three-judge bench ruled out that the Mombasa Republican Council is not an illegal group. The judges went ahead to advise MRC to establish itself as a political organization recognized by the law and agitate for their demands within the constitution.

There is nothing hard like a group demanding something from the government without the knowledge of their history. This often leads to poor judgement and lack of direction while advocating for your rights. MRC needs to learn a bit of history!


Mombasa Republican Council

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) is a separatist organization[1] that is based at the coastal town of Mombasa which is about 500 kilometeres from Nairobi the capital city of Kenya. [2] The group claims that Mombasa and the coastal area are not part of Kenya and therefore should secede.

[edit]History

Mombasa Republican Council
 was formed in 1999 to address the political and economic discrimination against the people of the coast province.[3]. The group traces its secession claims to the 1895 and 1963 agreements transferring the ten-mile strip of land along the coast to the Government of Kenya. Some critics characterize these British agreements as a form of bribery designed to facilitate colonization of the interior; the creation of native reserves sowed the seeds of negativity ethnicity. The group contests these agreements as invalid, because they were enacted without the consent of coastal stakeholders, and says the state of Kenya has failed to honor the provisions designed to protect the coastal population.[4]

[edit]Secession claims

Mombasa Republican Council was dormant until 2008 when it first raised claims that Mombasa should secede from Kenya to become an independent state, their reason being that the secession would liberate the people of the coast province from marginalization by the successive governments in Kenya. The slogan they are using is Pwani Si Kenya ("The Coast is not part of Kenya").[5] This move made the government to declare the group an illegal organization together with another 33 groups.[6]
Mombasa Republican Council has contested the government's decision in the court. The high court of Mombasa uplifted the ban and cited that claiming the group was illegal was unconstitutional.[7]






International Journal of Humanities and Social Science                                            Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
176
The Ten Miles Coastal strip: An Examination of the Intricate Nature of Land
Question at Kenyan Coast
Dr. John M. Mwaruvie
Department of History
Political Science and Public Administration
Moi University
P. O. Box 3900, Eldoret, Kenya.
Abstract
In  1886, the Anglo-German Treaty was signed between Britain and Germany to determine their spheres of
influence in East Africa. Since none of them wanted to be in direct conflict with the sultan of Zanzibar, they
decided to allocate him ten miles coastal strip running from Kipini in the north to Ruvuma River in the south. The
Germans thereafter paid for the right to use the sultan’s ten mile possession on the German East African section.
The British on the other hand opted to pay annual rent to the sultan equivalent to the amount of tax collected by
sultan in that part adjacent to East Africa protectorate(EAP). The complexity of this treaty came into focus in
1920 when the British government wanted to change the status of EAP into a colony. The British realized that the
ten miles coastal strip could not be annexed without causing international conflict because of the various treaties
that the sultan had entered with various powers guaranteeing their sovereignty and control over her coastal
dominions. Thus, the colonial government went for a quick fix by renaming the territory, Colony and Protectorate
of Kenya. The protectorate designated the ten miles coastal strip while all the land from the ten miles became the
colony. It was this quick fix that later reared its ugly face at the time of independence when the Arabs in the
coastal strip rejected to be incorporated in independent Kenya. They wanted to secede to join fellow Arab
administration at Zanzibar. Just like the colonialists, Kenyatta went for another quick fix by signing an agreement
with the then Prime Minister of Zanzibar guaranteeing land ownership to sultans’ subjects at the expense of
African inhabitants who for many centuries had remained as squatters. This paper examines the historical
injustices that African inhabitants have endured over the centuries and how the various administrations have
overlooked their interests. Consequently, land at the coast has become so expensive to an extent that ordinary
people cannot afford. It is argued that a solution  has to be found to contain the recurrent land conflicts
experienced every election year.
INTRODUCTION
East Africa Protectorate (EAP) as Kenya was known from 1895 to 1920 has a complex history compared to other
British possessions in Eastern Africa like Uganda and Tanganyika (Tanzania). EAP attracted European settlers
from Britain, South Africa and a few from other British dominions. These European settlers desired to create a
“white colony” like Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa. However, their population was too low to
force the Imperial government to grant them such status. It was this realization that made the British government
in 1923 to issue the Devonshire White paper to the effect that where interests of alien races (meaning the British
and the Asians) conflicted with African interests, the latter would be paramount.
1 While this declaration was
hollow in all intent and purposes it gave precedent on how to resolve conflicts arising from the interests of
Europeans, Asians and Arabs and the inhabitants of the country. However, this declaration, it would seem it did
not change the uneasy relations that existed between the Africans and the Arabs residing within the ten mile
coastal strip which was assumed to belong to the sultanate of Zanzibar. This sultanates nominal possession of the
coastal strip as per 1895 agreement between the British and the sultan later proved to be a major obstacle to the
development of EAP. This anomaly was detected when the European settlers and the Colonial Office hoped to
finance major developments in the protectorate using cheap loans borrowed under Colonial Stock Act of 1900.
2
                                               
*Paper prepared for Moi University and Indiana University symposium on dialogue and Peace and Reconciliation in Kenya.
Moi University, 13-15 May 2009.
1
Robert Maxon, Struggle for Kenya: The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative, 1912-1923 (Mudson: Fairleigh
Dickinson University Press, 1993), 276-79.
2
This Colonial Stock Act was passed when Joseph Chamberlain was Secretary of State and was a great advocate for the
development of what he called “Imperial Estates” to refer to British overseas possessions.The Special Issue on Contemporary Research in Social Science                        © Centre for Promoting Ideas, USA
177
However, they were advised that the protectorate could not benefit from such funds since it was not a colony or a
British dominion. The Crown Agents for the Crown advised the CO to look for ways of changing the status of the
protectorate to a colony.  It was this desire to change the status of the protectorate to a colony that exposed the
intricate political arrangement of the territory. It became clear that the incorporation of the ten mile coastal strip
into the colony would arouse international conflicts from other countries that had entered into trading agreements
with the sultan of Zanzibar. The sultanate of Zanzibar for instance had signed various treaties with United States
of America in 1833,
3
France in 1862, and Germany in 1886, which recognized his sovereignty. Notably, the 1886
Anglo-Germany treaty did not abrogate the former treaties. In fact, the 1886 treaty is the one that internationally
recognized the ten mile coastal strip as the rightful dominion of the sultanate of Zanzibar.
A minute by Herbert Read, the then Assistant Undersecretary of State observed that whether the loan was raised
by Lloyd, a private bank that had showed interest to fund railway construction in EAP  or by the Colonial Agents
of the Crown (CA), the protectorate would only get better terms if annexed and made a colony. He thought there
was no reason not to annex EAP with the exception of the Sultanate of Witu. He further observed that the control
of the protectorate at the time had been tightened and there would be no objection by the subjects.
  4
   Ideally, what
the CA were suggesting seemed to be a sensible economic argument that through the Colonial Stock Act of 1900,
the country would get a loan at a low interest rates, but they overlooked the political and constitutional
implications to the Africans in the protectorate who were not privy to what was being schemed. Admittedly, if the
First World War did not break out in 1914, it seems the protectorate would have become a colony by then.
Thus, after the First World War the proposal to annex the protectorate was revisited. Read suggested that the
matter of annexation of EAP and the construction of the  Uasin Gishu railway be discussed with the newly
appointed governor, Sir Edward Northey, who was in London at the time.
5
A minute by William Cecil
Bottomley, First clerk, East Africa Department shows that Northey agreed to take up the matter after reporting to
his station in Nairobi. As a result, the Secretary of State (S of S) Walter Long wrote him a letter authorizing him
to enter negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar to allow the annexation of his ten-mile coastal strip to be part of
the new colony.
  6
Northey visited Zanzibar in September 1919 and discussed the matter with British Resident in
Zanzibar, Sinclair who thereafter met the Sultan on 13 September 1919.
What is interesting about the deliberations between the sultan and Sinclair is that the Resident tried to convince
the sultan that the annexation of his ten miles coastal strip was to ease administration of EAP and “there was no
intention of detracting from His Highness’s prestige and that the revenue of sultanate would not suffer in
consequence.”
7
As would have been expected from a “puppet” administration, the sultan accepted the proposal by
stating that:
He was the child of His Majesty’s Government and was always ready loyally to carry
out its wishes. If His Majesty’s government considered the alienation desirable  he
was quite prepared to agree to it.
8
But Sinclair observed that although the sultan did not object to the proposal, Zanzibar had unique and complicated
treaties with both the governments of France and United States of America and therefore advised that the two
governments should be approached to agree on cession.
9 When reporting the deliberations with the sultan,
Northey on his part reinforced the need for the S of S to approach France to request them to modify their 10
March 1862 Declaration that had guaranteed the Independence of the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar.
10 
It is not clear why the representatives of the British and the Germans thought that the sultan’s territory extended
for only ten miles from the sea. They also assumed that any person residing within the ten miles was a subject of
the sultan. After the 10 miles, the British protectorate was recognized.
11 
                                                
3
Robert Maxon. East Africa: An Introductory (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 1994), 117.
4
Minute by Read, 27 July 1914, CO 533/144.
5
Minute by Read, 29 October 1918, CO 533/196.
6
Long to Northey, 18 November 1918, CO 533/196.
7
Sinclair to Northey, 13 September 1919, CO 533/214.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Northey to Milner, 31 October 1919, CO 533/214.
11
Maxon, East Africa, 131.International Journal of Humanities and Social Science                                            Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
178
By another treaty arrangement with the sultan of Zanzibar, the British government was allowed to administer the
10 miles coastal strip on condition that the government in EAP would pay £6,000 as interest for the £200,000 paid
to Imperial British East Africa Company for the company assets in the sultanates Zanzibar by 1895 plus £11,000
being annuity previously paid by the company. In total the government was required to pay £17,000 to the Sultan
of Zanzibar.
12  
Unfortunately, the 10 miles coastal strip was not clearly delimited, and the treaty remained a
thorny issue when deliberating the status of Africans residing in the controversial area. Even at the time it was
noted by Bottomley that it was difficult to determine “who British subjects were and which the sultan’s were.”
  13
The annexation was officially issued on 11 June 1920 when the Order-In-Council was passed,
14  
but the
Legislative Council in the EAP was supposed to ratify it. Accordingly, when Northey returned to the protectorate
he announced the annexation of the EAP during a Legislative Council session on 9 July 1920.
15
He told the
councillors that the annexation was passed to enable the colony raise cheap development funds to construct the
Uasin Gishu railway, Kilindini harbour and the Thika railway extension. Thus, Northey, observed:
We shall now be able to float a loan for the development of the country. I anticipate
roughly that we shall require £2,000,000 for Plateau railway, £500,000 for Thika
extension, £1,000,000 for Kilindini harbour.
  16
The name, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, remained unquestioned until 1960 when discussions started on the
future independence of Kenya. The Arabs within ten Mile coastal strip waged a protracted struggle to pull out and
join Sultanate of Zanzibar or form a self governing Mwambao territory. In an attempt to seek compromise
between the coastal inhabitants, a joint commission under Sir James Robertson was put in place to seek views on
the future of the ten miles coastal strip.
THE GENESIS OF THE LAND QUESTION AT THE COAST
A protracted debate has been ranging on the legitimate owners of land within the ten miles coastal strip. The
earliest documents demonstrate that Africans inhabited the region. The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea written
around 100 AD by anonymous writer mentions the inhabitants of the region as men who were black and of great
stature ruled by chiefs.
17
They also used wicker baskets to fish. These inhabitants traded with merchants from
Mediterranean world, Persia, Oman, India and China. These were probably the proto Swahili. There is no doubt
that the Swahili controlled the coast before Arabs settled in the area. It would seem the conquest of the coast by
the Portuguese from 1500 and the ruthless administration they established was very un popular with East Africans
and was the main cause for the Swahili to enter into a marriage of convenience with the Oman Arabs.
In 1660 Swahili sent a delegation to Muscat the headquarters of Oman leadership seeking military support to raid
the coast of the Christian presence. The delegation was led by Mwinyi Nguti, Mwinyi Mole bin Haji, Mwinyi
Ndao bin Haji, Motomato wa Mtorogo and Kubo wa Mwamzungu but the sultan refused to assist.
18
A second
delegation was sent in 1729 and was able to convince the sultan to offer military assistance. It was this military
assistance that routed the Portuguese out of East Africa in 1798 after a series of battles over Mombasa.
19
Later
sultan Said Seyyid transferred his headquarters from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1856 which enabled him and his
descendants to have full political control over East African coast.
20
The colonial domination created by the Arabs
at the coast made various European powers to enter into various treaties with the sultan for they assumed he was
the master of all inhabitants of the coast. It was on this assumption that the British and the Germans decided to set
aside the ten mile coastal strip for the sultan of Zanzibar.
                                               
12 William MacGregor Ross, Kenya From Within (London: Frank Cass, 1927), 30.
13
Minute by Bottomley, 23 October 1918, CO 533/196.
14
Milner to Bowring, telegram, 23 June 1920, CO 533/240.
15
East African Standard, 10 July 1920.
16
Ibid.
17
Robert O. Collins, Eastern Africa: VOL. II of African History, Text and Readings (New York: Markus Wiener Publishing,
1990), 48-49.
18
Amos Kareith, “revisiting ten-mile strip controversy,” The Standard, September 30, 2007.
19
Maxon, East Africa, 46-50.
20
Ibid., 113-117.The Special Issue on Contemporary Research in Social Science                        © Centre for Promoting Ideas, USA
179
The Germans later paid £200,000 to the sultan as compensation for the control of the coastline adjacent to their
German East Africa.
21
The British on their part they opted to pay an annual rent of £17,000 to the sultan of
Zanzibar. It was this political arrangement that made the Arabs at the coast to claim autonomy once it was clear to
them that the British were about to grant independence to African nationalists.
LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE AND TEN MILE COASTAL STRIP
The first Lancaster House Conference on the independence of Kenya opened the  Pandora’s Box in as far as
coastal strip was concerned. Consequently, during the second Lancaster Conference there were two parallel
conferences, one on colony and the other on the protectorate. The protectorate which covered the ten miles coastal
strip was represented by Arabs, but Jomo Kenyatta and Ronald Ngala and a few other African delegates attended
the deliberations of both conferences. The Arabs wanted the ten miles coastal strip to either be given autonomy or
secede to join the sultanate of Zanzibar instead of being incorporated in independent Kenya. Sheikh Salim
Muhaahamy submitted that:
The Arab community would not regard their rights and interests as being adequately
protected if the government of the protectorate were ceded to a Kenya government
responsible to Kenyan electorate.
22
Their observation was that if Her Majesty’s Government was to cede the territory to Kenya it would be a breach
of faith entrusted on them by 1895 agreement. The African elected leaders led by Ngala were of the view that the
coastal strip was rightfully African territory and should be part and parcel of independent Kenya.
23
In fact, Oginga
Odinga wanted the 1895 agreement between the sultan of Zanzibar to be declared null and void.
24
Tom Mboya
was even more candid and proposed that those Arabs that were not ready to join Independent Kenya were free to
go back to Arabia.
25
It was due to this conflicting positions presented by Africans and Arabs at the conference that
made the British government and the sultanate of Zanzibar to appoint Sir James Robertson, the former governor
of Nigeria to head a joint commission to inquire on the future of the ten miles coastal strip in 1961.
Nevertheless, the appointment of a commission did not end the conflict. The debate continued in Kenyan
Legislative Council (LegCo) and among the various political parties formed after the first Lancaster Conference
on the future of Mwambao. While African political parties; Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya
African Democratic Union (KADU) supported integration of the coastal strip, the Arabs formed Mwambao
United Front to further their political interests. No wonder O. S. Bassaddiq argued that the “the coastal strip is not
a part of Kenya and has only been linked with Kenya for the convenience of the administrators.”
26
However,
Jomo Kenyatta countered such claims by declaring that:
Kenya is one and nobody can remove any part of it without encroaching seriously on our
present nation. Any move to separate the strip from the reminder of the colony would be
resisted without reservation by our people.
27
Sir JAMES ROBERTSON’S REPORT
Robertson’ commission received presentations from Africans and Arabs and made important observations. First,
the autonomy of the coastline was complicated by Mombasa being the chief port serving not only Kenya but
Uganda, the great lakes region, Sudan and Northern Eastern Tanzania.
28
Furthermore, the development of the port
was financed by loans paid by subjects of Kenya and could not be controlled by a small part of the country.
Second, the ten mile coastal strip was always administered as part of Kenya and the boundaries of the coastal strip
have never been marked nor observed by the British administrators.
                                               
21
Colonial Office: The Kenya Coastal Strip: Report of Commissioner, Cmnd 1585 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary
Office, 1961), 31.
22
The Times of London, January 29, 1960.
23
East African Standard, March 9, 1962. East African Standard, March 10, 1962.
24
The Times of London, January 20, 1960.
25
The Times of London, June 2, 1961.
26
East African Standard, March 9, 1962.
27
Ibid.
28
Colonial Office: Report of the Commissioner, presented to Parliament by Secretary of State for Colonies by command of
Her Majesty, December 1961.Cmnd 1585. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1961).International Journal of Humanities and Social Science                                            Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
180
The incorporation of the coastline into independent Kenya would not cause any administrative problem. However,
its secession would make Kenya a landlocked country. The report noted that the sultan’s sovereignty, although
not in doubt, was nominal, but was emotionally a fact that could not be ignored despite the fact that the only
manifestation of his authority was the flag which flew everywhere in the strip.
Third, it was noted that the protectorate government continued to pay annual lease of £1700 a year as
compensation and therefore the British government should pay some money to compensate the sultan for the loss
of revenue.
Fourth, the Arab population was a minority at the coast and its autonomy would not make any economic sense.
African in the coastal strip had asked for integration with the rest of Kenya.
Fifth, the sultan had no objection to incorporation of the coastal strip as long as some safeguards were put in place
to protect the interests of the subjects, allow Islamic traditions and education to continue and guarantee of land
titles for Arabs.
ROBERTSON’S RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the varied presentations, Sir James Robertson recommended that:
(1) Muslim law, religion and education should be incorporated in the Kenyan constitution, which later
became the basis of establishing the Kadhi’s Courts in Kenya.
(2) The strip should be integrated with Kenya before independence and that the 1895 agreement should be
abrogated.
(3) Proposed retention of Arab administrative officers; the Liwalis and Mudirs at the coast to ensure Muslim
traditions are observed.
(4) Recommended that land titles should be acknowledged and guaranteed. This could be safeguarded by
creating Coast Land Board with executive and advisory roles to handle land disputes, its disposal and
transfer of titles.
(5) He recommended that the sultan should be paid compensation of £675,000 by the British government for
agreeing to forfeit his claim over the coastal strip. The government should also pay £400,000 for the
£200,000, plus interest loaned by the sultan after the Germans bought their section of ten mile coastal
strip from the sultan but the money was banked in London.
These recommendations were presented to British Parliament by Secretary of State for colonies (S of S) in
December 1961. The document became part of discussion items during the second Lancaster House Conference in
1962.During the conference the Queen’s Counsel Dingle Foot represented the sultan of Zanzibar and emphasized
that the sultan’s desire was to have an agreement that would take into consideration the welfare of the coast
peoples.
29
Thus, the Kenyan leaders were required to show good will and commitment in protecting the rights of
the sultanates subjects so as to end fear and suspicion on the part of the Arabs. As a demonstration of this good
will, Jomo Kenyatta signed two agreements; one with the Prime Minister of Zanzibar on 5
th
October, 1963. The
second agreement was between Kenyatta the Secretary of State for Colonies, Prime minister of Zanzibar and the
sultan on 8
th
October, 1963.
KENYATTA AGREEMENT WITH PRIME MINISTER OF ZANZIBAR
The  agreement was signed in London on 5
th
October, 1963 and Kenyatta placed on record the following
undertakings by the government of Kenya.
30
(1) That free exercise of any creed or religion will at all times be safeguarded and, in particular, His
Highness’s present subjects who are the Muslim faith and their descendants will at all times be ensured of
complete freedom of worship and the preservation of their own religious buildings and institutions
(2) The jurisdiction of Chief Kadhis will at all times be preserved and will be extended to the determination
of questions of Muslim law relating to personal status in the proceedings in which all parties profess the
Muslim religion
                                               
29
East Africa Standard, March 12, 1962. Also East African Standard, March 14, 1962.
30
The agreements are presented as appendix to presentation in British Parliament by Secretary of State for Colonies in
October 1963. Kenya Coastal Strip: Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom, His Highness the Sultan of
Zanzibar, the Government of Kenya and the Government of Zanzibar.  Cmnd. 2161.(London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1963).The Special Issue on Contemporary Research in Social Science                        © Centre for Promoting Ideas, USA
181
(3) The freehold titles to land in the coast region that are already registered will at all times be recognized,
steps will be taken to ensure the continuation of the procedure for the registration of new freehold titles
and rights of freeholders will at all times be preserved save for so far as it may be necessary to acquire
freehold land for public purposes, in which event full and prompt compensation will be paid.
This document was signed by Jomo Kenyatta and Mohammed Shamte, Prime Minister of Zanzibar.
As a follow up to this agreement, on 8
th
October, 1963 the two Prime Mnisters and the Sultan of Zanzibar His
Highness Seyyid Jamshid bin Abdula signed a joint agreement with the S of S for Colonies Duncan Sandays to
revoke 1890 and1895 agreements it was agreed further that:
(1) The territories comprised in the Kenya protectorate shall cease to form part of His Highness dominions
and shall thereupon form part of Kenya
(2) The agreement of 14
th
June 1890 in so far as it applies to those territories and the agreement of 14
th
December 1895 shall cease to have effect.
OBSERVATION
(1) The commitment by the Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta minimized the fears of the Arabs over their future
stay in Kenya by reassuring them of their land security at the coast. However, the commitment ignored
the aspirations of Africans who thought that independence would address centuries of land dispositions
by Arab settlers. It meant that Africans would continue to be squatters. The coastal politicians thought
that Kenyatta’s commitment would be revoked once Kenya attained her independence; Kenyatta had no
intension of revoking it. He actually became a beneficiary for managed to substantial amount of land
within the coastal strip and other parts of the coast. Apparently, he became like the new sultan and spent
most of his vacation time at the coast.
(2) Further by accepting to recognize freehold title deeds held by a few Asians overlooked African traditional
land tenure system. The Miji Kenda continues to have rightful claims over certain sacred Kayas within
the former ten mile coastal strip, but have no title deeds to support their traditional claims. Consequently,
tourists' hotels and cottages have been built on some of these sacred places.
(3) Additionally, Kenyatta recognized the concept of willing seller and willing seller. Consequently, only
those with money could own land within the coastal strip based on the law of supply and demand. This
has led to exorbitant price for land within the coastal strip especially land adjacent to the beaches.
(4) The land that did not have title deeds was thereafter declared trust land which the government exploited to
settle both politically and ethnically correct people. This policy has left many coastal people landless
while upcountry people own fertile land in the region. No wonder, every election year since 1990 there
have been ethnic conflicts between the coast people and upcountry people who are referred to as “watu
wa bara.”
(5) Admittedly, the thirst to own land at the coast by private developers has led to grapping of beaches which
has denied citizens the right to enjoy and have access to these natural resources. In normal circumstances
the beaches should have been retained as public recreational areas like Mama Ngina Gardens instead of
being exclusive areas for tourists.
(6) It is equally disheartening to observe that international agreements which did not recognize the rights of
the Africans have continued to affect the Kenyan people fifty years after independence. There is need to
re-examine all colonial agreements to address adequately historical injustices. The government should
come up with a land policy that would address these historical injustices without creating new ones. The
policy should address land use, protection of wetlands and environment in general for the future
generations.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
From the fore going discussion it is apparent that the question of historical injustices is a very complex matter. It
is noted that the land question at the coast pre dates British colonization. The British accepted the status quo and
also the post colonial regimes. However, Africans at the coast still feel that their land rights have been ignored all
this time. On the other hand, the Arabs who have freehold title deeds have been in the area for a long time and are
citizens of this country. The solution to the problem is not to ignore it, but to accept that it is there and should be
sorted out. The remedy is to identify first the land owned by absentee landlords. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science                                            Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
182
Then the government should repossess such land and distribute it to deserving squatters who have been living and
working on such land for a long time.
Secondly, all the idle land or the one kept for speculative purposes should be repossessed and distributed to the
only the people willing to develop it for the well being of the people of Kenya. This policy should be applied in
all parts of the country. Before land title is granted there should be a development plan to prove that the applicant
would adequately develop it.
Third, land already conserved as kayas and other areas of public interest should be gazetted as national
monuments and protected to thwart foreign hunger for land to construct tourist hotels and cottages.
Finally, the problem faced by people in coast province is failure by the government to review some draconian
colonial agreements that do not serve the welfare of the people of Kenya. The government should be bold enough
to put its foot down to address land situation in the country for the benefit of all inhabitants. It should be
emphasized that it is not a must that every individual should have a share of a small piece of land. It is the high
time that Kenyans considered land planning and utilization seriously.

The above documents are proves of defining moments in history of Kenya and how agreements involving the Sultan of Zanzibar, president Kenyatta and the British colonialists signed an agreement releasing the 10-mile coastal strip from Zanzibar to Kenya.

In a new twist of events, it is ironical that those calling for secession are not the original coastal Arabs but African coastal tribes like the Digo that migrated to the coast.

BLOG STAND: we agree with MRC that indeed coast province has been marginalized and sidelined for a very longtime. Being the second highest income earner province after Nairobi, the region has some of the poorest districts in Kenya. In the recent released national exam results (KCPE), coast province came in last. These are genuine grievances and there are right channels to address them but calling for secession is misdirected and can call for criminal acts.

In one of the documents signed by the Kaya elders of the Mijikenda, they declared their allegiance to citizens of Kenya and that they did not wish a Katanga repeat in the coast.

Lessons from Katanga and Biafra

BIAFRA

The Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Nigerian-Biafran War, 6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970, was a political conflict caused by the attemptedsecession of the southeastern provinces of Nigeria as the self-proclaimedRepublic of Biafra. The conflict was the result of economic, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions among the various peoples of Nigeria

As with many other African nations, Nigeria was an artificial structure initiated by former colonial powers which had neglected to consider religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences.[5] Nigeria, which gained independence from Britain in 1960, had at that time a population of 60 million people consisting of nearly 300 differing ethnic and cultural groups.
The causes of the Nigerian civil war were diverse although, in his memoir, journalist Alex Mitchell blames "involvement of the British, Dutch, French and Italian oil companies whose battle for the rich Nigerian oilfields started the civil war and kept it going"[6]
More than fifty years earlier, Great Britain carved an area out of West Africa containing hundreds of different ethnic groups and unified it, calling it Nigeria. Although the area contained many different groups, the three predominant groups were the Igbo, which formed between 60–70% of the population in the southeast, the Hausa-Fulani, which formed about 65% of the peoples in the northern part of the territory; the Yoruba, which formed about 75% of the population in the southwestern part.[citation needed]
The semi-feudal and Islamic Hausa-Fulani in the North were traditionally ruled by an autocratic, conservative Islamic hierarchy consisting of Emirs who, in turn, owed their allegiance to a supreme Sultan. This Sultan was regarded as the source of all political power and religious authority.
The Yoruba political system in the southwest, like that of the Hausa-Fulani, also consisted of a series of monarchs being the Oba. The Yoruba monarchs, however, were less autocratic than those in the North, and the political and social system of the Yoruba accordingly allowed for greater upward mobility based on acquired rather than inherited wealth and title.
The Igbo in the southeast, in contrast to the two other groups, lived mostly in mostly autonomous, democratically organised communities although there were monarchs in many of these ancient cities such as the Kingdom of Nri, which in its zenith controlled most of Igbo land, including influence on the Anioma people, Arochukwu which controlled slavery in Igbo land and Onitsha. Unlike the other two regions, decisions among the Igbo were made by a general assembly in which men could participate.[7]
The differing political systems among these three peoples reflected and produced divergent customs and values. The Hausa-Fulani commoners, having contact with the political system only through their village head who was designated by the Emir or one of his subordinates, did not view political leaders as amenable to influence. Political decisions were to be submitted to. As in every highly authoritarian religious and political system leadership positions were taken by persons willing to be subservient and loyal to superiors. A chief function of this political system was to maintain Islamic and conservative values, which caused many Hausa-Fulani to view economic and social innovation as subversive or sacrilegious.
In contrast to the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo often participated directly in the decisions which affected their lives. They had a lively awareness of the political system and regarded it as an instrument for achieving their own personal goals. Status was acquired through the ability to arbitrate disputes that might arise in the village, and through acquiring rather than inheriting wealth. With their emphasis upon social achievement and political participation, the Igbo adapted to and challenged colonial rule in innovative ways.
These tradition-derived differences were perpetuated and, perhaps, even enhanced by the British system of colonial rule in Nigeria. In the North, the British found it convenient to rule indirectly through the Emirs, thus perpetuating rather than changing the indigenous authoritarian political system. As a concomitant of this system, Christian missionaries were excluded from the North, and the area thus remained virtually closed to European cultural imperialism, in contrast to the Igbo, the richest of whom sent many of their sons to British universities. During the ensuing years, the Northern Emirs thus were able to maintain traditional political and religious institutions, while reinforcing their social structure. In this division, the North, at the time of independence in 1960, was by far the most underdeveloped area in Nigeria, with a literacy rate of 2% as compared to 19.2% in the East (literacy in Arabic script, learned in connection with religious education, was higher). The West enjoyed a much higher literacy level, being the first part of the country to have contact with western education in addition to the free primary education program of the pre-independence Western Regional Government.[8]
In the South, the missionaries rapidly introduced Western forms of education. Consequently, the Yoruba were the first group in Nigeria to adopt Western bureaucratic social norms and they provided the first African civil servants, doctors, lawyers, and other technicians and professionals.
In Igbo areas, missionaries were introduced at a later date because of British difficulty in establishing firm control over the highly autonomous Igbo communities. (Audrey Chapman, “Civil War in Nigeria,” Midstream, Feb 1968). However, the Igbo people took to Western education actively, and they overwhelmingly came to adopt Christianity. Population pressure in the Igbo homeland combined with aspirations for monetary wages drove thousands of Igbo to other parts of Nigeria in search of work. By the 1960s Igbo political culture was more unified and the region relatively prosperous, with tradesmen and literate elites active not just in the traditionally Igbo South, but throughout Nigeria.[9]
The British colonial ideology that divided Nigeria into three regions North, West and East exacerbated the already well-developed economic, political, and social differences among Nigeria's different ethnic groups. It has been described as a "deliberate ethnic and religious gerrymander to keep the nation weak, unstable and open to the plunder of its vast oil reserves by UK companies, led by British Petroleum (BP)".[6] The country was divided in such a way that the North had slightly more population than the other two regions combined. On this basis the Northern Region was allocated a majority of the seats in the Federal Legislature established by the colonial authorities. Within each of the three regions the dominant ethnic groups; the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo respectively formed political parties that were largely regional and based on ethnic allegiances: the Northern People's Congress (NPC) in the North; the Action Group in the West (AG): and the National Conference of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in the East. These parties were not exclusively homogeneous in terms of their ethnic or regional make-up; the disintegration of Nigeria resulted largely from the fact that these parties were primarily based in one region and one tribe. To simplify matters, we will refer to them here as the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo-based; or Northern, Western and Eastern parties.
During the 1940s and 1950s the Igbo and Yoruba parties were in the forefront of the fight for independence from Britain. They also wanted an independent Nigeria to be organised into several small states so that the conservative North could not dominate the country. Northern leaders, however, fearful that independence would mean political and economic domination by the more Westernized elites in the South, preferred the perpetuation of British rule. As a condition for accepting independence, they demanded that the country continue to be divided into three regions with the North having a clear majority. Igbo and Yoruba leaders, anxious to obtain an independent country at all costs, accepted the Northern demands.

On 15 January 1966, Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and other junior Army officers (mostly majors and captains) attempted a coup d'état. It was generally speculated that the coup had been initiated by the Igbos, and for their own primary benefit, because of the ethnicity of those that were killed. The two major political leaders of the north, The prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and The Premier of the northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello were executed by Major Nzeogwu. Also murdered was Sir Ahmadu Bello's wife. Meanwhile, the President, Sir Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, was on an extended vacation in the West Indies. He did not return until days after the coup. However, evidence exists to the contrary. For example, the coup was not only generally applauded in the Northern region, it was most successful there. The fact that only one Igbo officer, Lt Col Arthur Unegbe, was killed can be attributed to the mere fact that the officers in charge of implementing Nzeogwu's plans in the East were incompetent. The coup, also referred to as "The Coup of the Five Majors", has been described in some quarters as Nigeria's only revolutionary coup.[10] This was the first coup in the short life of Nigeria's nascent 2nd democracy. Claims of electoral fraud was one of the reasons given by the coup plotters. This coup resulted in General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo and head of the Nigerian Army, taking power as President, becoming the first military head of state in Nigeria.
The coup d'état itself failed, as Ironsi rallied the military against the plotters. But Ironsi did not bring the failed plotters to trial as requested by military law and as advised by most northern and western officers. Ironsi then instituted military rule, by subverting the constitutional succession and alleging that the democratic institutions had failed and that, while he was defending them, they clearly needed revision and clean-up before reversion back to democratic rule. The coup, despite its failure, was wrongly perceived as having benefited mostly the Igbo because most of the known coup plotters were Igbo. However Ironsi, himself an Igbo, was thought to have made numerous attempts to please Northerners. The other event that also fuelled the so called "Igbo conspiracy" was the killing of Northern leaders, and the killing of the Colonel Shodeinde's pregnant wife by the coup executioners. Despite the overwhelming contradictions of the coup being executed by mostly Northern soldiers (such as John Atom Kpera later military governor of Benue State), the killing of Igbo soldier Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Unegbe by coup executioners, and Ironsi's termination of an Igbo-led coup, the ease by which Ironsi stopped the coup led to suspicion that the Igbo coup plotters planned all along to pave the way for Ironsi to take the reins of power in Nigeria. It also ignored the fact that the army was largely composed of Northerners at the private level, but Igbo at the officer level, and thus promotions would have to draw upon a large body of Igbo officers. As the officer corps of the army was dominated by the Igbos logic would have had it that mainly Igbo officers could have been killed in the coup if there wasn't an "igbo Conspiracy". On the contrary, the murdered victims of this coup were mainly northerners. The reason for this coup has never been made clear. If it was a revolutionary coup as some have claimed why were the prime minister and premier of the north killed? It has been proven that they both died with less than ten pounds in their respective personal accounts and with one village home each to their names. This was a young country trying to find its way and that way was abruptly scuttled by overzealous army officers numbering above twenty.

On 29 July 1966, the Northerners executed a counter-coup. This coup was led by Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed. It placed Lt. Col.Yakubu Gowon into power. Gowon was chosen as a compromise candidate. He was a Northerner, a Christian, from a minority tribe, and had a good reputation within the army. Ethnic tensions due to the coup and counter-coup increased and the sequels to the mass pogroms in May 1966 repeated later the same year in July and September known as the large-scale massacres of Christian Ibo living in the Muslim north.

The military governor of the Igbo-dominated southeast, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, citing the northern massacres and electoral fraud, proclaimed with southern parliament the secession of the south-eastern region from Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra, an independent nation on 30 May 1967. Although the very young nation had a chronic shortage of weapons to go to war, it was determined to defend itself. There was much sympathy in Europe and elsewhere yet only five countries[who?] recognised the new republic.
Several peace accords especially the one held at Aburi, Ghana (the Aburi Accord) collapsed and the shooting war soon followed. Ojukwu managed at Aburi to get agreement to a confederation for Nigeria, rather than a federation. He was warned by his advisers that this reflected a failure of Gowon to understand the difference and, that being the case, predicted that it would be reneged upon. When this happened, Ojukwu regarded it as both a failure by Gowon to keep to the spirit of the Aburi agreement, and lack of integrity on the side of Nigeria Military Government in the negotiations toward a united Nigeria. Gowon's advisers, to the contrary, felt that he had enacted as much as was politically feasible in fulfilment of the spirit of Aburi.[11] The Eastern region was very ill equipped for war, outmanned and outgunned by the Nigerians. Their advantages included fighting in their homeland, support of most Easterners, determination, and use of limited resources. The British and Soviet Union supported (especially militarily) the Nigerian government while Canada and France helped the Biafrans. The United States seemed to be neutral but helped the Biafrans through the Red Cross.

he Nigerian government launched a "police action" to retake the secessionist territory. The war began on 6 July 1967 when Nigerian Federal troops advanced in two columns into Biafra. The Nigerian army offensive was through the north of Biafra led by Colonel Shuwa and the local military units were formed as the 1st Infantry Division. The division was led mostly by northern officers. After facing unexpectedly fierce resistance and high casualties, the right-hand Nigerian column advanced on the town of Nsukka which fell on 14 July, while the left-hand column made for Garkem, which was captured on 12 July. At this stage of the war, the other regions of Nigeria (the West and Mid-West) still considered the war as a confrontation between the north (mainly Hausas) against the east (mainly Igbos)[citation needed]. But the Biafrans responded with an offensive of their own when, on 9 August, the Biafran forces moved west into the Mid-Western Nigerian region across the Niger river, passing through Benin City, until they were stopped at Ore (in present day Ondo State) just over the state boundary on 21 August, just 130 miles east of the Nigerian capital of Lagos. The Biafran attack was led by Lt. Col. Banjo, a Yoruba, with the Biafran rank of brigadier. The attack met little resistance and the Mid-West was easily taken over. This was due to the pre-secession arrangement that all soldiers should return to their regions to stop the spate of killings, in which Igbo soldiers had been major victims.[8][12] The Nigerian soldiers that were supposed to defend the Mid-West state were mostly Mid-West Igbo and while some were in touch with their eastern counterparts, others resisted. General Gowon responded by asking ColonelMurtala Mohammed (who later became head of state in 1975) to form another division (the 2nd Infantry Division) to expel the Biafrans from the Mid-West, as well as defend the West side and attack Biafra from the West as well. As Nigerian forces retook the Mid-West, the Biafran military administrator declared the Republic of Benin on 19 September.

Although Benin City was retaken by the Nigerians on 22 September, the Biafrans succeeded in their primary objective by tying down as many Nigerian Federal troops as much as they could. Gen. Gowon also launched an offensive into Biafra south from the Niger Delta to the riverine area using the bulk of the Lagos Garrison command under Colonel Benjamin Adekunle (called the Black Scorpion) to form the 3rd Infantry Division (which was later renamed as the 3rd Marine Commando). As the war continued, the Nigerian Army recruited amongst a wider area, including the Yoruba, Itshekiri, Urhobo, Edo, Ijaw, and etc. Four battalions of the Nigerian 2nd Infantry Division were needed to drive the Biafrans back and eliminate their territorial gains made during the offensive. The Nigerians were repulsed three times as they attempted to cross the River Niger during October, resulting in the loss of thousands of troops, dozens of tanks and equipment. The first attempt by the 2nd Infantry Division on 12 October to cross the Niger from the town of Asaba to the Biafran city of Onitsha cost the Nigerian Federal Army over 5,000 soldiers killed, wounded, captured or missing.

From 1968 onward, the war fell into a form of stalemate, with Nigerian forces unable to make significant advances into the remaining areas of Biafran control due to stiff resistance and major defeats in Abagana, Arochukwu, Oguta, Umuahia (Operation OAU), Onne, Ikot Ekpene, and etc.[13] But another Nigerian offensive from April to June 1968 began to close the ring around the Biafrans with further advances on the two northern fronts and the capture of Port Harcourt on 19 May 1968. The blockade of the surrounded Biafrans led to a humanitarian disaster when it emerged that there was widespread civilian hunger and starvation in the besieged Igbo areas. The Biafran government claimed that Nigeria was using hunger and genocide to win the war, and sought aid from the outside world. A Nigerian commission, including British doctors from the Liverpool University School of Tropical Medicine, visited Biafra after the war[14] and concluded that the evidence of deliberate starvation was overplayed, caused by confusion between the symptoms of starvation and various tropical illnesses. They did not doubt that starvation had occurred, but were unsurprisingly not clear of the extent to which it was a result of the Nigerian blockade or the restriction of food to the civilians by the Biafran government[11]

Many volunteer bodies organised blockade-breaking relief flights into Biafra, carrying food, medicines, and sometimes (according to some claims) weapons.[15] More common was the claim that the arms-carrying aircraft would closely shadow aid aircraft, making it more difficult to distinguish between aid aircraft and military supply aircraft.[15] It has been argued that by prolonging the war the Biafran relief effort (characterised by Canadian development consultant Ian Smillie as "an act of unfortunate and profound folly"), contributed to the deaths of as many as 180,000 civilians.[16]
In response to the Nigerian government using foreigners to lead some advances, the Biafran government also began hiring foreign mercenaries to extend the war.[citation needed] Only German born Rolf Steiner a Lt. Col. with the 4th Commandos, and Major Taffy Williams, a Welshman would remain for the duration.[17] Nigeria also used 'mercenaries', in the form of Egyptian pilots for their air force MiG 17 fighters and Il 28 bombers. The Egyptians conscripts frequently attacked civilian rather than military targets, bombing numerous Red Cross shelters.[15]
Bernard Kouchner was one of a number of French doctors who volunteered with the French Red Cross to work in hospitals and feeding centres in besieged Biafra. The Red Cross required volunteers to sign an agreement, which was seen by some (like Kouchner and his supporters) as being similar to a gag order, that was designed to maintain the organisation's neutrality, whatever the circumstances. Kouchner and the other French doctors signed this agreement.
After entering the country, the volunteers, in addition to Biafran health workers and hospitals, were subjected to attacks by the Nigerian army, and witnessed civilians being murdered and starved by the blockading forces. Kouchner also witnessed these events, particularly the huge number of starving children, and when he returned to France, he publicly criticised the Nigerian government and the Red Cross for their seemingly complicit behaviour. With the help of other French doctors, Kouchner put Biafra in the media spotlight and called for an international response to the situation. These doctors, led by Kouchner, concluded that a new aid organisation was needed that would ignore political/religious boundaries and prioritise the welfare of victims. They created Médecins Sans Frontières in 1971 (Doctors Without Borders).[18]
In September 1968, the federal army planned what Gowon described as the "final offensive." Initially the final offensive was neutralised by Biafran troops by the end of the year after several Nigerian troops were routed in Biafran ambushes. In the latter stages, a Southern FMG offensive managed to break through. However in 1969, the Biafrans launched several offensives against the Nigerians in their attempts to keep the Nigerians off-balance starting in March when the 14th Division of the Biafran army recaptured Owerri and moved towards Port Harcourt, but were halted just north of the city. In May 1969, Biafran commandos recaptured oil wells in Kwale. In July 1969, Biafran forces launched a major land offensive supported by foreign mercenary pilots continuing to fly in food, medical supplies and weapons. Most notable of the mercenaries was Swedish Count Carl Gustav von Rosen who led air attacks with five Malmö MFI-9MiniCOIN small piston-engined aircraft, armed with rocket pods and machine guns. His BAF (Biafran Air Force) consisted of three Swedes, two Biafrans and an ex-RCAF pilot. From 22 May to 8 July 1969 von Rosen's small force attacked Nigerian military airfields in Port Harcourt, Enugu, Benin City and Ughelli, destroying or damaging a number of Nigerian Air Force jets used to attack relief flights, including a few Mig-17's and three out of Nigeria's six Ilyushin Il-28 bombers that were used to bomb Biafran villages and farms on a daily basis. Although the Biafran offensives of 1969 were a tactical success, the Nigerians soon recovered. The Biafran air attacks did disrupt the combat operations of the Nigerian Air Force, but only for a few months.
One of the interesting characters assisting Count Carl Gustav von Rosen was Lynn Garrison, an ex-RCAF fighter pilot. He introduced the Count to a Canadian method of dropping bagged supplies to remote areas in Canada without losing the contents. He showed how one sack of food could be placed inside a larger sack before the supply drop. When the package hit the ground the inner sack would rupture while the outer one kept the contents intact. With this method many tons of food were dropped to many Biafrans who would otherwise have died of starvation.

With increased British support, the Nigerian federal forces launched their final offensive against the Biafrans once again on 23 December 1969 with a major thrust by the 3rd Marine Commando Division (the division was commanded by Col. Obasanjo (who later became president twice) which succeeded in splitting the Biafran enclave into two by the end of the year. The final Nigerian offensive, named "Operation Tail-Wind", was launched on 7 January 1970 with the 3rd Marine Commando Division attacking, and supported by the 1st Infantry division to the north and the 2nd Infantry division to the south. The Biafran town of Owerri fell on 9 January, and Uli fell on 11 January. Only a few days earlier, Ojukwu fled into exile by flying by plane to the republic of Côte d'Ivoire, leaving his deputy Philip Effiong to handle the details of the surrender to General Yakubu Gowon of the federal army on 13 January 1970. The war finally ended a few days later with the Nigerian forces advancing in the remaining Biafran held territories with little opposition.
After the war Gowon said, "The tragic chapter of violence is just ended. We are at the dawn of national reconciliation. Once again we have an opportunity to build a new nation. My dear compatriots, we must pay homage to the fallen, to the heroes who have made the supreme sacrifice that we may be able to build a nation, great in justice, fair trade, and industry."[19]
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The war cost the Igbos a great deal in terms of lives, money and infrastructure. It has been estimated that up to three million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease.[20] Reconstruction, helped by the oil money, was swift; however, the old ethnic and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics. Accusations were made of Nigerian government officials diverting resources meant for reconstruction in the former Biafran areas to their ethnic areas. Military government continued in power in Nigeria for many years, and people in the oil-producing areas claimed they were being denied a fair share of oil revenues.[21]Laws were passed mandating that political parties could not be ethnically or tribally based; however, it has been hard to make this work in practice.
Igbos who ran for their lives during the pogroms and war returned to find their positions had been taken over; and when the war was over the government did not feel any need to re-instate them, preferring to regard them as having resigned. This reasoning was also extended to Igbo owned properties and houses. People from other regions were quick to take over any house owned by an Igbo, especially in the Port Harcourt area. The Nigerian Government justified this by terming such properties abandoned. This, however, has led to a feeling of an injustice as the Nigerian government policies were seen as further economically disabling the Igbos even long after the war. Further feelings of injustice were caused by Nigeria, changing its currency so that Biafran supplies of pre-war Nigerian currency were no longer honoured, at the end of the war, only N£20 was given to any easterner despite what ever amount of money he or she had in the bank. This was applied irrespective of their banking in pre-war Nigerian currency or Biafran currency. This was seen as a deliberate policy to hold back the Igbo middle class, leaving them with little wealth to expand their business interests.[22]
On Monday 29 May 2000, The Guardian (Nigeria) reported that President Olusegun Obasanjo commuted to retirement the dismissal of all military persons who fought for the breakaway state of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. In a national broadcast, he said that the decision was based on the principle that "justice must at all times be tempered with mercy."

KATANGA

On 11 July 1960, with the support of Belgian business interests and over 6000 Belgian troops, the province of Katanga in the southeast declared independence as the State of Katanga under the leadership of Moise Tshombe, leader of the local CONAKAT party. Tshombe was known to be close to the Belgian industrial companies which mined the rich resources of copper, gold and uranium. Katanga was one of the richest and most developed areas of the Congo. Without Katanga, Congo would lose a large part of its mineral assets and consequently government income.[20]
In defense of the decision to declare independence, Tshombe said Katanga was "seceding from chaos". In particular Tshombe believed if he allowed the mutinous ANC to enter it would result in lawlessness and bloodshed. With Belgian assistance theKatanga Gendarmerie was created as an effective military force. At the core of the Katangese forces were several hundred European mercenaries many of which were recruited in Belgium.[21]
Almost from the beginning, the new state faced a rebellion in the north in Luba areas. This was led by a political party called Association of the Luba People of Katanga(BALUBAKAT). In January 1961, Katanga faced a secession crisis of its own when BALUBAKAT leaders declared independence from Katanga. Throughout the period of the secession, Katangese forces were never able to completely control the province.[22]
Katanga received assistance from numerous foreign mercenaries, mostly white South Africans, Belgians and other Europeans, including the Irish right-wing fighter Mike Hoare. Major Mike Hoare's first mercenary action was in Katanga, as the province first attempted to break away from the newly independent Congo in 1960-61. His unit of mercenary fighters was called "4 Commando". South Africa's Apartheid government supported Katanga's secession bid, and facilitated the entrance of mercenaries to aid the Katangese cause.

Source: wikipedia

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