WHY THE GOVERNMENT OF
KENYA
DISCLAIMER- this is a
very long post!
Last week, a
three-judge bench ruled out that the Mombasa
There is nothing hard
like a group demanding something from the government without the knowledge of
their history. This often leads to poor judgement and lack of direction while
advocating for your rights. MRC needs to learn a bit of history!
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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[edit]History
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Mombasa Republican Council
was
formed in 1999 to address the political and economic discrimination against
the people of the coast province.[3]. The group traces its secession
claims to the 1895 and 1963 agreements transferring the ten-mile strip of
land along the coast to the Government of Kenya. Some critics characterize
these British agreements as a form of bribery designed to facilitate
colonization of the interior; the creation of native reserves sowed the seeds
of negativity ethnicity. The group contests these agreements as invalid,
because they were enacted without the consent of coastal stakeholders, and
says the state of
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[edit]Secession claims
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Mombasa Republican Council was
dormant until 2008 when it first raised claims that Mombasa should secede
from Kenya to become an independent state, their reason being that the
secession would liberate the people of the coast province from
marginalization by the successive governments in Kenya. The slogan they are
using is Pwani Si Kenya ("The Coast is
not part of
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International
Journal of Humanities and Social Science
Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
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176
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The Ten Miles
Coastal strip: An Examination of the Intricate Nature of Land
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Question at
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Dr. John M.
Mwaruvie
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Department of
History
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Political Science
and Public Administration
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Abstract
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In 1886, the Anglo-German Treaty was signed
between
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influence in
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decided to allocate
him ten miles coastal strip running from Kipini in the north to
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Germans thereafter
paid for the right to use the sultan’s ten mile possession on the German East
African section.
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The British on the
other hand opted to pay annual rent to the sultan equivalent to the amount of
tax collected by
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sultan in that part
adjacent to
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1920 when the
British government wanted to change the status of EAP into a colony. The
British realized that the
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ten miles coastal
strip could not be annexed without causing international conflict because of
the various treaties
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that the sultan had
entered with various powers guaranteeing their sovereignty and control over
her coastal
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dominions. Thus,
the colonial government went for a quick fix by renaming the territory,
Colony and Protectorate
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of
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colony. It was this
quick fix that later reared its ugly face at the time of independence when
the Arabs in the
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coastal strip
rejected to be incorporated in independent
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administration at
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with the then Prime
Minister of
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African inhabitants
who for many centuries had remained as squatters. This paper examines the
historical
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injustices that
African inhabitants have endured over the centuries and how the various
administrations have
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overlooked their
interests. Consequently, land at the coast has become so expensive to an
extent that ordinary
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people cannot
afford. It is argued that a solution
has to be found to contain the recurrent land conflicts
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experienced every
election year.
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INTRODUCTION
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East Africa
Protectorate (EAP) as
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British possessions
in Eastern Africa like
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from
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“white colony” like
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force the Imperial
government to grant them such status. It was this realization that made the
British government
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in 1923 to issue
the
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and the Asians)
conflicted with African interests, the latter would be paramount.
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1 While this
declaration was
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hollow in all
intent and purposes it gave precedent on how to resolve conflicts arising
from the interests of
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Europeans, Asians
and Arabs and the inhabitants of the country. However, this declaration, it
would seem it did
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not change the
uneasy relations that existed between the Africans and the Arabs residing
within the ten mile
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coastal strip which
was assumed to belong to the sultanate of
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coastal strip as
per 1895 agreement between the British and the sultan later proved to be a
major obstacle to the
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development of EAP.
This anomaly was detected when the European settlers and the Colonial Office
hoped to
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finance major
developments in the protectorate using cheap loans borrowed under Colonial
Stock Act of 1900.
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2
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*Paper prepared for
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1
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Robert Maxon,
Struggle for
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2
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This Colonial Stock
Act was passed when Joseph Chamberlain was Secretary of State and was a great
advocate for the
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development of what
he called “Imperial Estates” to refer to British overseas possessions.The
Special Issue on Contemporary Research in Social Science © Centre for
Promoting Ideas,
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177
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However, they were
advised that the protectorate could not benefit from such funds since it was
not a colony or a
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British dominion.
The Crown Agents for the Crown advised the CO to look for ways of changing
the status of the
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protectorate to a
colony. It was this desire to change
the status of the protectorate to a colony that exposed the
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intricate political
arrangement of the territory. It became clear that the incorporation of the
ten mile coastal strip
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into the colony
would arouse international conflicts from other countries that had entered
into trading agreements
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with the sultan of
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of
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3
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France in 1862, and
Germany in 1886, which recognized his sovereignty. Notably, the 1886
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Anglo-Germany
treaty did not abrogate the former treaties. In fact, the 1886 treaty is the
one that internationally
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recognized the ten
mile coastal strip as the rightful dominion of the sultanate of
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A minute by Herbert
Read, the then Assistant Undersecretary of State observed that whether the
loan was raised
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by Lloyd, a private
bank that had showed interest to fund railway construction in EAP or by the Colonial Agents
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of the Crown (CA),
the protectorate would only get better terms if annexed and made a colony. He
thought there
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was no reason not
to annex EAP with the exception of the Sultanate of Witu. He further observed
that the control
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of the protectorate
at the time had been tightened and there would be no objection by the
subjects.
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4
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Ideally, what
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the CA were
suggesting seemed to be a sensible economic argument that through the
Colonial Stock Act of 1900,
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the country would
get a loan at a low interest rates, but they overlooked the political and
constitutional
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implications to the
Africans in the protectorate who were not privy to what was being schemed.
Admittedly, if the
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First World War did
not break out in 1914, it seems the protectorate would have become a colony
by then.
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Thus, after the
First World War the proposal to annex the protectorate was revisited. Read
suggested that the
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matter of
annexation of EAP and the construction of the
Uasin Gishu railway be discussed with the newly
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appointed governor,
Sir Edward Northey, who was in
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5
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A minute by William
Cecil
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Bottomley, First
clerk, East Africa Department shows that Northey agreed to take up the matter
after reporting to
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his station in
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to enter
negotiations with the Sultan of
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the new colony.
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6
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Northey visited
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What is interesting
about the deliberations between the sultan and Sinclair is that the Resident
tried to convince
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the sultan that the
annexation of his ten miles coastal strip was to ease administration of EAP
and “there was no
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intention of
detracting from His Highness’s prestige and that the revenue of sultanate
would not suffer in
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consequence.”
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7
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As would have been
expected from a “puppet” administration, the sultan accepted the proposal by
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stating that:
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He was the child of
His Majesty’s Government and was always ready loyally to carry
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out its wishes. If
His Majesty’s government considered the alienation desirable he
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was quite prepared
to agree to it.
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8
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But Sinclair
observed that although the sultan did not object to the proposal,
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treaties with both
the governments of France and
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governments should
be approached to agree on cession.
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9 When reporting
the deliberations with the sultan,
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Northey on his part
reinforced the need for the S of S to approach
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March 1862
Declaration that had guaranteed the
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10
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It is not clear why
the representatives of the British and the Germans thought that the sultan’s
territory extended
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for only ten miles
from the sea. They also assumed that any person residing within the ten miles
was a subject of
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the sultan. After
the 10 miles, the British protectorate was recognized.
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11
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3
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Robert Maxon.
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4
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Minute by Read, 27
July 1914, CO 533/144.
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5
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Minute by Read, 29
October 1918, CO 533/196.
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6
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Long to Northey, 18
November 1918, CO 533/196.
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7
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Sinclair to
Northey, 13 September 1919, CO 533/214.
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8
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Ibid.
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9
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Ibid.
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10
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Northey to Milner,
31 October 1919, CO 533/214.
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11
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Maxon,
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178
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By another treaty
arrangement with the sultan of
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10 miles coastal
strip on condition that the government in EAP would pay £6,000 as interest
for the £200,000 paid
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to Imperial British
East Africa Company for the company assets in the sultanates
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being annuity
previously paid by the company. In total the government was required to pay
£17,000 to the Sultan
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of
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12
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Unfortunately, the
10 miles coastal strip was not clearly delimited, and the treaty remained a
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thorny issue when
deliberating the status of Africans residing in the controversial area. Even
at the time it was
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noted by Bottomley
that it was difficult to determine “who British subjects were and which the
sultan’s were.”
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13
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The annexation was
officially issued on 11 June 1920 when the Order-In-Council was passed,
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14
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but the
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Legislative Council
in the EAP was supposed to ratify it. Accordingly, when Northey returned to
the protectorate
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he announced the
annexation of the EAP during a Legislative Council session on 9 July 1920.
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15
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He told the
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councillors that
the annexation was passed to enable the colony raise cheap development funds
to construct the
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Uasin Gishu
railway, Kilindini harbour and the Thika railway extension. Thus, Northey,
observed:
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We shall now be
able to float a loan for the development of the country. I anticipate
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roughly that we
shall require £2,000,000 for Plateau railway, £500,000 for Thika
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extension,
£1,000,000 for Kilindini harbour.
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16
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The name, Colony
and Protectorate of
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future independence
of
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join Sultanate of
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between the coastal
inhabitants, a joint commission under Sir James Robertson was put in place to
seek views on
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the future of the
ten miles coastal strip.
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THE GENESIS OF THE
LAND QUESTION AT THE COAST
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A protracted debate
has been ranging on the legitimate owners of land within the ten miles
coastal strip. The
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earliest documents
demonstrate that Africans inhabited the region. The Periplus of the
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around 100 AD by
anonymous writer mentions the inhabitants of the region as men who were black
and of great
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stature ruled by
chiefs.
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17
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They also used
wicker baskets to fish. These inhabitants traded with merchants from
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Mediterranean
world, Persia, Oman,
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that the Swahili
controlled the coast before Arabs settled in the area. It would seem the
conquest of the coast by
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the Portuguese from
1500 and the ruthless administration they established was very un popular
with East Africans
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and was the main
cause for the Swahili to enter into a marriage of convenience with the
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In 1660 Swahili
sent a delegation to
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the coast of the
Christian presence. The delegation was led by Mwinyi Nguti, Mwinyi Mole bin
Haji, Mwinyi
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Ndao bin Haji,
Motomato wa Mtorogo and Kubo wa Mwamzungu but the sultan refused to assist.
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18
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A second
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delegation was sent
in 1729 and was able to convince the sultan to offer military assistance. It
was this military
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assistance that
routed the Portuguese out of East Africa in 1798 after a series of battles
over
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19
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Later
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sultan Said Seyyid
transferred his headquarters from
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descendants to have
full political control over East African coast.
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20
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The colonial
domination created by the Arabs
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at the coast made
various European powers to enter into various treaties with the sultan for
they assumed he was
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the master of all
inhabitants of the coast. It was on this assumption that the British and the
Germans decided to set
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aside the ten mile
coastal strip for the sultan of
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12 William
MacGregor Ross,
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13
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Minute by
Bottomley, 23 October 1918, CO 533/196.
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14
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Milner to Bowring,
telegram, 23 June 1920, CO 533/240.
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15
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East African
Standard, 10 July 1920.
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16
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Ibid.
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17
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Robert O. Collins,
Eastern Africa: VOL. II of African History, Text and
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1990), 48-49.
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18
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Amos Kareith,
“revisiting ten-mile strip controversy,” The Standard, September 30, 2007.
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19
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Maxon,
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20
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Ibid., 113-117.The
Special Issue on Contemporary Research in Social Science © Centre for
Promoting Ideas,
|
179
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The Germans later
paid £200,000 to the sultan as compensation for the control of the coastline
adjacent to their
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21
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The British on
their part they opted to pay an annual rent of £17,000 to the sultan of
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them that the
British were about to grant independence to African nationalists.
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The first
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coastal strip was
concerned. Consequently, during the second
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conferences, one on
colony and the other on the protectorate. The protectorate which covered the
ten miles coastal
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strip was
represented by Arabs, but Jomo Kenyatta and Ronald Ngala and a few other
African delegates attended
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the deliberations
of both conferences. The Arabs wanted the ten miles coastal strip to either
be given autonomy or
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secede to join the
sultanate of Zanzibar instead of being incorporated in independent
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Muhaahamy submitted
that:
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The Arab community
would not regard their rights and interests as being adequately
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protected if the
government of the protectorate were ceded to a
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responsible to
Kenyan electorate.
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22
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Their observation
was that if Her Majesty’s Government was to cede the territory to
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of faith entrusted
on them by 1895 agreement. The African elected leaders led by Ngala were of
the view that the
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coastal strip was
rightfully African territory and should be part and parcel of independent
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23
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In fact, Oginga
|
Odinga wanted the
1895 agreement between the sultan of
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24
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Tom Mboya
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was even more
candid and proposed that those Arabs that were not ready to join Independent
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go back to
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25
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It was due to this
conflicting positions presented by Africans and Arabs at the conference that
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made the British
government and the sultanate of
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of
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Nevertheless, the
appointment of a commission did not end the conflict. The debate continued in
Kenyan
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Legislative Council
(LegCo) and among the various political parties formed after the first
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on the future of
Mwambao. While African political parties;
|
African Democratic
Union (KADU) supported integration of the coastal strip, the Arabs formed
Mwambao
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United Front to
further their political interests. No wonder O. S. Bassaddiq argued that the
“the coastal strip is not
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a part of
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26
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However,
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Jomo Kenyatta
countered such claims by declaring that:
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present nation. Any
move to separate the strip from the reminder of the colony would be
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resisted without
reservation by our people.
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27
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Sir JAMES
ROBERTSON’S REPORT
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Robertson’
commission received presentations from Africans and Arabs and made important
observations. First,
|
the autonomy of the
coastline was complicated by
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Uganda, the great
lakes region,
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28
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Furthermore, the
development of the port
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was financed by
loans paid by subjects of
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Second, the ten
mile coastal strip was always administered as part of
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have never been
marked nor observed by the British administrators.
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21
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Colonial Office:
The
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Office, 1961), 31.
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22
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The Times of
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23
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East African
Standard, March 9, 1962. East African Standard, March 10, 1962.
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24
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The Times of
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25
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The Times of
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26
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East African
Standard, March 9, 1962.
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27
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Ibid.
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28
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Colonial Office:
Report of the Commissioner, presented to Parliament by Secretary of State for
Colonies by command of
|
Her Majesty,
December 1961.Cmnd 1585. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office,
1961).International Journal of Humanities and Social Science
Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
|
180
|
The incorporation
of the coastline into independent
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its secession would
make
|
not in doubt, was
nominal, but was emotionally a fact that could not be ignored despite the
fact that the only
|
manifestation of
his authority was the flag which flew everywhere in the strip.
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Third, it was noted
that the protectorate government continued to pay annual lease of £1700 a
year as
|
compensation and
therefore the British government should pay some money to compensate the
sultan for the loss
|
of revenue.
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Fourth, the Arab
population was a minority at the coast and its autonomy would not make any
economic sense.
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African in the
coastal strip had asked for integration with the rest of
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Fifth, the sultan
had no objection to incorporation of the coastal strip as long as some
safeguards were put in place
|
to protect the
interests of the subjects, allow Islamic traditions and education to continue
and guarantee of land
|
titles for Arabs.
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ROBERTSON’S
RECOMMENDATIONS
|
In view of the
varied presentations, Sir James Robertson recommended that:
|
(1) Muslim law,
religion and education should be incorporated in the Kenyan constitution,
which later
|
became the basis of
establishing the Kadhi’s Courts in
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(2) The strip
should be integrated with
|
abrogated.
|
(3) Proposed
retention of Arab administrative officers; the Liwalis and Mudirs at the
coast to ensure Muslim
|
traditions are
observed.
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(4) Recommended
that land titles should be acknowledged and guaranteed. This could be
safeguarded by
|
creating
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transfer of titles.
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(5) He recommended
that the sultan should be paid compensation of £675,000 by the British government
for
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agreeing to forfeit
his claim over the coastal strip. The government should also pay £400,000 for
the
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£200,000, plus
interest loaned by the sultan after the Germans bought their section of ten
mile coastal
|
strip from the
sultan but the money was banked in
|
These
recommendations were presented to British Parliament by Secretary of State
for colonies (S of S) in
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December 1961. The
document became part of discussion items during the second
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1962.During the
conference the Queen’s Counsel Dingle Foot represented the sultan of
|
that the sultan’s
desire was to have an agreement that would take into consideration the
welfare of the coast
|
peoples.
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29
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Thus, the Kenyan
leaders were required to show good will and commitment in protecting the
rights of
|
the sultanates
subjects so as to end fear and suspicion on the part of the Arabs. As a
demonstration of this good
|
will, Jomo Kenyatta
signed two agreements; one with the Prime Minister of
|
th
|
October, 1963. The
|
second agreement
was between Kenyatta the Secretary of State for Colonies, Prime minister of
|
sultan on 8
|
th
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October, 1963.
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KENYATTA AGREEMENT
WITH PRIME MINISTER OF
|
The agreement was signed in
|
th
|
October, 1963 and
Kenyatta placed on record the following
|
undertakings by the
government of
|
30
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(1) That free
exercise of any creed or religion will at all times be safeguarded and, in
particular, His
|
Highness’s present
subjects who are the Muslim faith and their descendants will at all times be
ensured of
|
complete freedom of
worship and the preservation of their own religious buildings and
institutions
|
(2) The
jurisdiction of Chief Kadhis will at all times be preserved and will be
extended to the determination
|
of questions of
Muslim law relating to personal status in the proceedings in which all
parties profess the
|
Muslim religion
|
29
|
30
|
The agreements are
presented as appendix to presentation in British Parliament by Secretary of
State for Colonies in
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October 1963.
|
181
|
(3) The freehold
titles to land in the coast region that are already registered will at all
times be recognized,
|
steps will be taken
to ensure the continuation of the procedure for the registration of new
freehold titles
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and rights of
freeholders will at all times be preserved save for so far as it may be
necessary to acquire
|
freehold land for
public purposes, in which event full and prompt compensation will be paid.
|
This document was
signed by Jomo Kenyatta and Mohammed Shamte, Prime Minister of
|
As a follow up to
this agreement, on 8
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th
|
October, 1963 the
two Prime Mnisters and the Sultan of
|
Highness Seyyid
Jamshid bin Abdula signed a joint agreement with the S of S for Colonies
Duncan Sandays to
|
revoke 1890 and1895
agreements it was agreed further that:
|
(1) The territories
comprised in the
|
and shall thereupon
form part of
|
(2) The agreement
of 14
|
th
|
June 1890 in so far
as it applies to those territories and the agreement of 14
|
th
|
December 1895 shall
cease to have effect.
|
OBSERVATION
|
(1) The commitment
by the Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta minimized the fears of the Arabs over
their future
|
stay in
|
the aspirations of
Africans who thought that independence would address centuries of land
dispositions
|
by Arab settlers.
It meant that Africans would continue to be squatters. The coastal
politicians thought
|
that Kenyatta’s
commitment would be revoked once
|
intension of
revoking it. He actually became a beneficiary for managed to substantial
amount of land
|
within the coastal
strip and other parts of the coast. Apparently, he became like the new sultan
and spent
|
most of his
vacation time at the coast.
|
(2) Further by
accepting to recognize freehold title deeds held by a few Asians overlooked
African traditional
|
land tenure system.
The Miji Kenda continues to have rightful claims over certain sacred Kayas
within
|
the former ten mile
coastal strip, but have no title deeds to support their traditional claims.
Consequently,
|
tourists' hotels
and cottages have been built on some of these sacred places.
|
(3) Additionally,
Kenyatta recognized the concept of willing seller and willing seller.
Consequently, only
|
those with money
could own land within the coastal strip based on the law of supply and
demand. This
|
has led to
exorbitant price for land within the coastal strip especially land adjacent
to the beaches.
|
(4) The land that
did not have title deeds was thereafter declared trust land which the
government exploited to
|
settle both
politically and ethnically correct people. This policy has left many coastal
people landless
|
while upcountry
people own fertile land in the region. No wonder, every election year since
1990 there
|
have been ethnic
conflicts between the coast people and upcountry people who are referred to
as “watu
|
wa bara.”
|
(5) Admittedly, the
thirst to own land at the coast by private developers has led to grapping of
beaches which
|
has denied citizens
the right to enjoy and have access to these natural resources. In normal
circumstances
|
the beaches should
have been retained as public recreational areas like
|
being exclusive
areas for tourists.
|
(6) It is equally
disheartening to observe that international agreements which did not
recognize the rights of
|
the Africans have
continued to affect the Kenyan people fifty years after independence. There
is need to
|
re-examine all
colonial agreements to address adequately historical injustices. The
government should
|
come up with a land
policy that would address these historical injustices without creating new
ones. The
|
policy should
address land use, protection of wetlands and environment in general for the
future
|
generations.
|
CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATION
|
From the fore going
discussion it is apparent that the question of historical injustices is a
very complex matter. It
|
is noted that the
land question at the coast pre dates British colonization. The British
accepted the status quo and
|
also the post
colonial regimes. However, Africans at the coast still feel that their land
rights have been ignored all
|
this time. On the
other hand, the Arabs who have freehold title deeds have been in the area for
a long time and are
|
citizens of this
country. The solution to the problem is not to ignore it, but to accept that it
is there and should be
|
sorted out. The
remedy is to identify first the land owned by absentee landlords.
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science
Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
|
182
|
Then the government
should repossess such land and distribute it to deserving squatters who have
been living and
|
working on such
land for a long time.
|
Secondly, all the
idle land or the one kept for speculative purposes should be repossessed and
distributed to the
|
only the people
willing to develop it for the well being of the people of
|
all parts of the
country. Before land title is granted there should be a development plan to
prove that the applicant
|
would adequately develop
it.
|
Third, land already
conserved as kayas and other areas of public interest should be gazetted as
national
|
monuments and
protected to thwart foreign hunger for land to construct tourist hotels and
cottages.
|
Finally, the
problem faced by people in coast province is failure by the government to
review some draconian
|
colonial agreements
that do not serve the welfare of the people of
|
to put its foot
down to address land situation in the country for the benefit of all
inhabitants. It should be
|
emphasized that it
is not a must that every individual should have a share of a small piece of
land. It is the high
|
time that Kenyans
considered land planning and utilization seriously.
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The above documents
are proves of defining moments in history of Kenya and how agreements involving
the Sultan of Zanzibar, president Kenyatta and the British colonialists signed
an agreement releasing the 10-mile coastal strip from Zanzibar to Kenya.
In a new twist of
events, it is ironical that those calling for secession are not the original
coastal Arabs but African coastal tribes like the Digo that migrated to the
coast.
BLOG STAND: we agree
with MRC that indeed coast province has been marginalized and sidelined for a
very longtime. Being the second highest income earner province after Nairobi , the region has some of the poorest districts in Kenya
In one of the
documents signed by the Kaya elders of the Mijikenda, they declared their
allegiance to citizens of Kenya
and that they did not wish a Katanga
Lessons from Katanga and Biafra …
The Nigerian Civil War,
also known as the Nigerian-Biafran
War, 6 July 1967 – 15 January 1970, was a political conflict caused by the
attemptedsecession of the southeastern provinces of Nigeria as the self-proclaimedRepublic of Biafra. The conflict was the result of economic,
ethnic, cultural and religious tensions among the various peoples of Nigeria
As with many other African nations, Nigeria was an artificial structure initiated
by former colonial powers which had neglected to consider religious,
linguistic, and ethnic differences.[5] Nigeria ,
which gained independence from Britain in 1960, had at that time a population
of 60 million people consisting of nearly 300 differing ethnic and cultural
groups.
The causes of the Nigerian civil war were
diverse although, in his memoir, journalist Alex Mitchell blames
"involvement of the British, Dutch, French and Italian oil companies whose
battle for the rich Nigerian oilfields started the civil war and kept it
going"[6]
More than fifty years earlier, Great Britain carved an area out of West Africa
containing hundreds of different ethnic groups and unified it, calling it Nigeria
The semi-feudal and Islamic Hausa-Fulani in the
North were traditionally ruled by an autocratic, conservative Islamic hierarchy
consisting of Emirs who, in turn, owed their allegiance to
a supreme Sultan. This
Sultan was regarded as the source of all political power and religious
authority.
The Yoruba political system in the southwest,
like that of the Hausa-Fulani, also consisted of a series of monarchs being the Oba.
The Yoruba monarchs, however, were less autocratic than those in the North, and
the political and social system of the Yoruba accordingly allowed for greater
upward mobility based on acquired rather than inherited wealth and title.
The Igbo in the southeast, in contrast to the
two other groups, lived mostly in mostly autonomous, democratically organised
communities although there were monarchs in many of these ancient cities such
as the Kingdom of Nri,
which in its zenith controlled most of Igbo land, including influence on the Anioma people, Arochukwu which controlled slavery in Igbo land
and Onitsha.
Unlike the other two regions, decisions among the Igbo were made by a general
assembly in which men could participate.[7]
The differing political systems among these
three peoples reflected and produced divergent customs and values. The
Hausa-Fulani commoners, having contact with the political system only through
their village head who was designated by the Emir or one of his subordinates,
did not view political leaders as amenable to influence. Political decisions
were to be submitted to. As in every highly authoritarian religious and
political system leadership positions were taken by persons willing to be
subservient and loyal to superiors. A chief function of this political system
was to maintain Islamic and conservative values, which caused many Hausa-Fulani
to view economic and social innovation as subversive or sacrilegious.
In contrast to the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo often
participated directly in the decisions which affected their lives. They had a
lively awareness of the political system and regarded it as an instrument for
achieving their own personal goals. Status was acquired through the ability to
arbitrate disputes that might arise in the village, and through acquiring
rather than inheriting wealth. With their emphasis upon social achievement and
political participation, the Igbo adapted to and challenged colonial rule in
innovative ways.
These tradition-derived differences were
perpetuated and, perhaps, even enhanced by the British system of colonial rule
in Nigeria Nigeria
In the South, the missionaries rapidly
introduced Western forms of education. Consequently, the Yoruba were the first
group in Nigeria
In Igbo areas, missionaries were introduced at a
later date because of British difficulty in
establishing firm control over
the highly autonomous Igbo communities. (Audrey Chapman, “Civil War in
Nigeria,” Midstream, Feb 1968). However, the Igbo people took to Western
education actively, and they overwhelmingly came to adopt Christianity.
Population pressure in the Igbo homeland combined with aspirations for monetary
wages drove thousands of Igbo to other parts of Nigeria Nigeria
The British colonial ideology that divided Nigeria into three regions North, West and East
exacerbated the already well-developed economic, political, and social
differences among Nigeria UK Nigeria
During the 1940s and 1950s the Igbo and Yoruba parties were in the forefront of the
fight for independence from Britain Nigeria
On 15 January 1966, Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and other junior Army officers (mostly
majors and captains) attempted a coup d'état. It was generally speculated that
the coup had been initiated by the Igbos, and for their own primary benefit,
because of the ethnicity of those that were killed. The two major political
leaders of the north, The prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and The
Premier of the northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello were executed by Major
Nzeogwu. Also murdered was Sir Ahmadu Bello's wife. Meanwhile, the President,
Sir Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, was on an extended vacation in the West Indies . He did not return until days after the coup.
However, evidence exists to the contrary. For example, the coup was not only
generally applauded in the Northern region, it was most successful there. The
fact that only one Igbo officer, Lt Col Arthur Unegbe, was killed can be
attributed to the mere fact that the officers in charge of implementing
Nzeogwu's plans in the East were incompetent. The coup, also referred to as
"The Coup of the Five Majors", has been described in some quarters as
Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria
The coup d'état itself failed, as Ironsi rallied
the military against the plotters. But Ironsi did not bring the failed plotters
to trial as requested by military law and as advised by most northern and
western officers. Ironsi then instituted military rule, by subverting the
constitutional succession and alleging that the democratic institutions had
failed and that, while he was defending them, they clearly needed revision and
clean-up before reversion back to democratic rule. The coup, despite its
failure, was wrongly perceived as having benefited mostly the Igbo because most of the known coup
plotters were Igbo. However Ironsi, himself an Igbo, was thought to have made
numerous attempts to please Northerners. The other event that also fuelled the
so called "Igbo conspiracy" was the killing of Northern leaders, and
the killing of the Colonel Shodeinde's pregnant wife by the coup executioners.
Despite the overwhelming contradictions of the coup being executed by mostly
Northern soldiers (such as John Atom Kpera later military governor of Benue State),
the killing of Igbo soldier Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Unegbe by coup
executioners, and Ironsi's termination of an Igbo-led coup, the ease by which
Ironsi stopped the coup led to suspicion that the Igbo coup plotters planned
all along to pave the way for Ironsi to take the reins of power in Nigeria. It
also ignored the fact that the army was largely composed of Northerners at the
private level, but Igbo at the officer level, and thus promotions would have to
draw upon a large body of Igbo officers. As the officer corps of the army was
dominated by the Igbos logic would have had it that mainly Igbo officers could
have been killed in the coup if there wasn't an "igbo Conspiracy". On
the contrary, the murdered victims of this coup were mainly northerners. The
reason for this coup has never been made clear. If it was a revolutionary coup
as some have claimed why were the prime minister and premier of the north
killed? It has been proven that they both died with less than ten pounds in
their respective personal accounts and with one village home each to their
names. This was a young country trying to find its way and that way was
abruptly scuttled by overzealous army officers numbering above twenty.
On 29 July 1966, the Northerners executed a counter-coup. This coup was
led by Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed. It placed Lt.
Col.Yakubu
Gowon into power. Gowon was chosen as a
compromise candidate. He was a Northerner, a Christian, from a minority tribe,
and had a good reputation within the army. Ethnic tensions due to the coup and
counter-coup increased and the sequels to the mass pogroms in May 1966 repeated
later the same year in July and September known as the large-scale
massacres of Christian Ibo living in the Muslim north.
The military governor of the Igbo-dominated
southeast, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, citing the northern
massacres and electoral fraud, proclaimed with southern parliament the
secession of the south-eastern region from Nigeria
as the Republic
of Biafra,
an independent nation on 30 May 1967. Although the very young nation had a
chronic shortage of weapons to go to war, it was determined to defend itself.
There was much sympathy in Europe and
elsewhere yet only five countries[who?] recognised the new republic.
Several peace accords especially the one held at Aburi, Ghana (the Aburi Accord)
collapsed and the shooting war soon followed. Ojukwu managed at Aburi to get
agreement to a confederation for Nigeria Nigeria Canada
and France United
States
he Nigerian government launched a "police
action" to retake the secessionist territory. The war began on 6 July
1967 when Nigerian Federal troops advanced in two columns into Biafra . The Nigerian army offensive was through the north
of Biafra led by Colonel Shuwa and the local
military units were formed as the 1st Infantry Division. The division was
led mostly by northern officers. After facing unexpectedly fierce resistance
and high casualties, the right-hand Nigerian column advanced on the town of Nsukka which fell on 14 July, while the left-hand column made
for Garkem, which was captured on 12 July. At this stage of the war, the other
regions of Nigeria
Although Benin City Edo , Ijaw, and etc. Four battalions of
the Nigerian 2nd Infantry Division were needed to drive the Biafrans back and
eliminate their territorial gains made during the offensive. The Nigerians were
repulsed three times as they attempted to cross the River Niger during October, resulting in the loss of thousands of
troops, dozens of tanks and equipment. The first attempt by the 2nd Infantry
Division on 12 October to cross the Niger
from the town of Asaba to the Biafran city of Onitsha
From 1968 onward, the war fell into a form of stalemate, with Nigerian
forces unable to make significant advances into the remaining areas of Biafran
control due to stiff resistance and major defeats in Abagana, Arochukwu, Oguta, Umuahia (Operation OAU), Onne, Ikot Ekpene, and etc.[13] But another Nigerian offensive from April to June 1968
began to close the ring around the Biafrans with further advances on the two
northern fronts and the capture of Port Harcourt on 19 May 1968. The blockade of the surrounded Biafrans
led to a humanitarian disaster when it emerged that there was widespread
civilian hunger and starvation in the besieged Igbo areas. The Biafran
government claimed that Nigeria
Many volunteer bodies organised
blockade-breaking relief flights into Biafra ,
carrying food, medicines, and sometimes (according to some claims) weapons.[15] More common was the claim that the
arms-carrying aircraft would closely shadow aid aircraft, making it more
difficult to distinguish between aid aircraft and military supply aircraft.[15] It has been argued that by prolonging
the war the Biafran relief effort (characterised by Canadian development
consultant Ian Smillie as "an act of unfortunate and profound
folly"), contributed to the deaths of as many as 180,000 civilians.[16]
In response to the Nigerian government using
foreigners to lead some advances, the Biafran government also began hiring
foreign mercenaries to extend the war.[citation needed] Only German born Rolf Steiner a Lt. Col. with the 4th Commandos, and
Major Taffy Williams,
a Welshman would remain for the duration.[17] Nigeria
Bernard Kouchner was one of a number of French doctors
who volunteered with the French Red Cross to work in hospitals and feeding
centres in besieged Biafra . The Red Cross
required volunteers to sign an agreement, which was seen by some (like Kouchner
and his supporters) as being similar to a gag order,
that was designed to maintain the organisation's neutrality, whatever the
circumstances. Kouchner and the other French doctors signed this agreement.
After entering the country, the volunteers, in
addition to Biafran health workers and hospitals, were subjected to attacks by
the Nigerian army, and witnessed civilians being murdered and starved by the
blockading forces. Kouchner also witnessed these events, particularly the huge
number of starving children, and when he returned to France Biafra
in the media spotlight and called for an international response to the
situation. These doctors, led by Kouchner, concluded that a new aid
organisation was needed that would ignore political/religious boundaries and
prioritise the welfare of victims. They created Médecins Sans Frontières in 1971 (Doctors Without Borders).[18]
In September 1968, the federal army planned what
Gowon described as the "final offensive." Initially the final
offensive was neutralised by Biafran troops by the end of the year after
several Nigerian troops were routed in Biafran ambushes. In the latter stages,
a Southern FMG offensive managed to break
through. However in 1969, the Biafrans launched several offensives against the
Nigerians in their attempts to keep the Nigerians off-balance starting in March
when the 14th Division of the Biafran army recaptured Owerri and moved towards Port Harcourt
One of the interesting characters assisting
Count Carl Gustav von Rosen was Lynn Garrison,
an ex-RCAF fighter pilot. He introduced the Count to a Canadian method of
dropping bagged supplies to remote areas in Canada
With increased British support, the Nigerian federal
forces launched their final offensive against the Biafrans once again on 23
December 1969 with a major thrust by the 3rd Marine Commando Division (the
division was commanded by Col. Obasanjo (who later became president twice)
which succeeded in splitting the Biafran enclave into two by the end of the
year. The final Nigerian offensive, named "Operation Tail-Wind", was
launched on 7 January 1970 with the 3rd Marine Commando Division attacking, and
supported by the 1st Infantry division to the north and the 2nd Infantry
division to the south. The Biafran town of Owerri fell on 9 January, and Uli fell on 11
January. Only a few days earlier, Ojukwu fled into exile by flying by plane to
the republic of Côte d'Ivoire,
leaving his deputy Philip Effiong to handle the details of the
surrender to General Yakubu Gowon of the federal army on 13 January
1970. The war finally ended a few days later with the Nigerian forces
advancing in the remaining Biafran held territories with little opposition.
After the war Gowon said, "The tragic chapter of
violence is just ended. We are at the dawn of national reconciliation. Once again
we have an opportunity to build a new nation. My dear compatriots, we must pay
homage to the fallen, to the heroes who have made the supreme sacrifice that we
may be able to build a nation, great in justice, fair trade, and
industry."[19]
[edit]
The war cost the Igbos a great deal in terms of lives, money and infrastructure. It has been estimated that up to three million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease.[20] Reconstruction, helped by the oil money, was swift; however, the old ethnic and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics. Accusations were made of Nigerian government officials diverting resources meant for reconstruction in the former Biafran areas to their ethnic areas. Military government continued in power inNigeria
The war cost the Igbos a great deal in terms of lives, money and infrastructure. It has been estimated that up to three million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease.[20] Reconstruction, helped by the oil money, was swift; however, the old ethnic and religious tensions remained a constant feature of Nigerian politics. Accusations were made of Nigerian government officials diverting resources meant for reconstruction in the former Biafran areas to their ethnic areas. Military government continued in power in
Igbos who ran for their lives during the pogroms
and war returned to find their positions had been taken over; and when the war
was over the government did not feel any need to re-instate them, preferring to
regard them as having resigned. This reasoning was also extended to Igbo owned
properties and houses. People from other regions were quick to take over any
house owned by an Igbo, especially in the Port
Harcourt
On Monday 29 May 2000, The Guardian (Nigeria) reported that President Olusegun
Obasanjo commuted to
retirement the dismissal of all military persons who fought for the breakaway
state of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war.
In a national broadcast, he said that the decision was based on the principle
that "justice must at all times be tempered with mercy."
On 11 July 1960, with the support of Belgian
business interests and over 6000 Belgian troops, the province of Katanga in
the southeast declared independence as the State of Katanga under the leadership of Moise Tshombe,
leader of the local CONAKAT party. Tshombe was known to be close
to the Belgian industrial companies which mined the rich resources of copper, gold and uranium.
Katanga was one of the
richest and most developed areas of the Congo Katanga , Congo
In defense of the decision to declare
independence, Tshombe said Katanga Belgium
Almost from the beginning, the new state faced a
rebellion in the north in Luba areas. This was led by a political
party called Association of
the Luba People of Katanga(BALUBAKAT). In January 1961, Katanga faced a secession crisis of its own when
BALUBAKAT leaders declared independence from Katanga
Source: wikipedia
