International
Journal of Humanities and Social Science
Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
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176
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The Ten Miles
Coastal strip: An Examination of the Intricate Nature of Land
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Question at Kenyan Coast
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Dr. John M.
Mwaruvie
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Department of
History
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Political Science
and Public Administration
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Moi University
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P. O. Box 3900, Eldoret,
Kenya.
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Abstract
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In 1886, the Anglo-German Treaty was signed
between Britain and Germany
to determine their spheres of
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influence in East Africa. Since none of them wanted to be in direct
conflict with the sultan of Zanzibar,
they
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decided to allocate
him ten miles coastal strip running from Kipini in the north to Ruvuma River in the south. The
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Germans thereafter
paid for the right to use the sultan’s ten mile possession on the German East
African section.
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The British on the
other hand opted to pay annual rent to the sultan equivalent to the amount of
tax collected by
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sultan in that part
adjacent to East Africa protectorate(EAP).
The complexity of this treaty came into focus in
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1920 when the
British government wanted to change the status of EAP into a colony. The
British realized that the
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ten miles coastal
strip could not be annexed without causing international conflict because of
the various treaties
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that the sultan had
entered with various powers guaranteeing their sovereignty and control over
her coastal
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dominions. Thus,
the colonial government went for a quick fix by renaming the territory,
Colony and Protectorate
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of Kenya.
The protectorate designated the ten miles coastal strip while all the land
from the ten miles became the
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colony. It was this
quick fix that later reared its ugly face at the time of independence when
the Arabs in the
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coastal strip
rejected to be incorporated in independent Kenya. They wanted to secede to
join fellow Arab
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administration at Zanzibar. Just like the
colonialists, Kenyatta went for another quick fix by signing an agreement
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with the then Prime
Minister of Zanzibar
guaranteeing land ownership to sultans’ subjects at the expense of
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African inhabitants
who for many centuries had remained as squatters. This paper examines the
historical
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injustices that
African inhabitants have endured over the centuries and how the various
administrations have
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overlooked their
interests. Consequently, land at the coast has become so expensive to an
extent that ordinary
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people cannot
afford. It is argued that a solution
has to be found to contain the recurrent land conflicts
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experienced every
election year.
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INTRODUCTION
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East Africa
Protectorate (EAP) as Kenya
was known from 1895 to 1920 has a complex history compared to other
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British possessions
in Eastern Africa like Uganda
and Tanganyika (Tanzania).
EAP attracted European settlers
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from Britain, South Africa and a few from other
British dominions. These European settlers desired to create a
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“white colony” like
Canada, New Zealand, Australia
and South Africa.
However, their population was too low to
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force the Imperial
government to grant them such status. It was this realization that made the
British government
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in 1923 to issue
the Devonshire White paper to the effect
that where interests of alien races (meaning the British
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and the Asians)
conflicted with African interests, the latter would be paramount.
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1 While this
declaration was
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hollow in all
intent and purposes it gave precedent on how to resolve conflicts arising
from the interests of
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Europeans, Asians
and Arabs and the inhabitants of the country. However, this declaration, it
would seem it did
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not change the
uneasy relations that existed between the Africans and the Arabs residing
within the ten mile
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coastal strip which
was assumed to belong to the sultanate of Zanzibar. This sultanates nominal
possession of the
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coastal strip as
per 1895 agreement between the British and the sultan later proved to be a
major obstacle to the
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development of EAP.
This anomaly was detected when the European settlers and the Colonial Office
hoped to
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finance major
developments in the protectorate using cheap loans borrowed under Colonial
Stock Act of 1900.
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2
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*Paper prepared for
Moi University
and Indiana University
symposium on dialogue and Peace and Reconciliation in Kenya.
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Moi University, 13-15 May 2009.
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1
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Robert Maxon,
Struggle for Kenya:
The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative, 1912-1923 (Mudson: Fairleigh
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Dickinson University Press, 1993), 276-79.
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2
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This Colonial Stock
Act was passed when Joseph Chamberlain was Secretary of State and was a great
advocate for the
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development of what
he called “Imperial Estates” to refer to British overseas possessions.The
Special Issue on Contemporary Research in Social Science © Centre for
Promoting Ideas, USA
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177
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However, they were
advised that the protectorate could not benefit from such funds since it was
not a colony or a
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British dominion.
The Crown Agents for the Crown advised the CO to look for ways of changing
the status of the
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protectorate to a
colony. It was this desire to change
the status of the protectorate to a colony that exposed the
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intricate political
arrangement of the territory. It became clear that the incorporation of the
ten mile coastal strip
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into the colony
would arouse international conflicts from other countries that had entered
into trading agreements
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with the sultan of Zanzibar. The sultanate
of Zanzibar for instance had signed various
treaties with United
States
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of America
in 1833,
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3
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France in 1862, and
Germany in 1886, which recognized his sovereignty. Notably, the 1886
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Anglo-Germany
treaty did not abrogate the former treaties. In fact, the 1886 treaty is the
one that internationally
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recognized the ten
mile coastal strip as the rightful dominion of the sultanate of Zanzibar.
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A minute by Herbert
Read, the then Assistant Undersecretary of State observed that whether the
loan was raised
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by Lloyd, a private
bank that had showed interest to fund railway construction in EAP or by the Colonial Agents
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of the Crown (CA),
the protectorate would only get better terms if annexed and made a colony. He
thought there
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was no reason not
to annex EAP with the exception of the Sultanate of Witu. He further observed
that the control
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of the protectorate
at the time had been tightened and there would be no objection by the
subjects.
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4
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Ideally, what
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the CA were
suggesting seemed to be a sensible economic argument that through the
Colonial Stock Act of 1900,
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the country would
get a loan at a low interest rates, but they overlooked the political and
constitutional
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implications to the
Africans in the protectorate who were not privy to what was being schemed.
Admittedly, if the
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First World War did
not break out in 1914, it seems the protectorate would have become a colony
by then.
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Thus, after the
First World War the proposal to annex the protectorate was revisited. Read
suggested that the
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matter of
annexation of EAP and the construction of the
Uasin Gishu railway be discussed with the newly
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appointed governor,
Sir Edward Northey, who was in London
at the time.
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5
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A minute by William
Cecil
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Bottomley, First
clerk, East Africa Department shows that Northey agreed to take up the matter
after reporting to
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his station in Nairobi. As a result,
the Secretary of State (S of S) Walter Long wrote him a letter authorizing
him
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to enter
negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar
to allow the annexation of his ten-mile coastal strip to be part of
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the new colony.
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6
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Northey visited Zanzibar in September
1919 and discussed the matter with British Resident in
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Zanzibar, Sinclair who thereafter met the Sultan
on 13 September 1919.
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What is interesting
about the deliberations between the sultan and Sinclair is that the Resident
tried to convince
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the sultan that the
annexation of his ten miles coastal strip was to ease administration of EAP
and “there was no
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intention of
detracting from His Highness’s prestige and that the revenue of sultanate
would not suffer in
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consequence.”
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7
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As would have been
expected from a “puppet” administration, the sultan accepted the proposal by
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stating that:
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He was the child of
His Majesty’s Government and was always ready loyally to carry
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out its wishes. If
His Majesty’s government considered the alienation desirable he
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was quite prepared
to agree to it.
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8
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But Sinclair
observed that although the sultan did not object to the proposal, Zanzibar had unique and
complicated
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treaties with both
the governments of France and United
States of America and therefore advised
that the two
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governments should
be approached to agree on cession.
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9 When reporting
the deliberations with the sultan,
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Northey on his part
reinforced the need for the S of S to approach France to request them to modify
their 10
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March 1862
Declaration that had guaranteed the Independence
of the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar.
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10
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It is not clear why
the representatives of the British and the Germans thought that the sultan’s
territory extended
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for only ten miles
from the sea. They also assumed that any person residing within the ten miles
was a subject of
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the sultan. After
the 10 miles, the British protectorate was recognized.
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11
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3
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Robert Maxon. East Africa: An Introductory (Morgantown: West Virginia
University Press, 1994), 117.
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4
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Minute by Read, 27
July 1914, CO 533/144.
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5
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Minute by Read, 29
October 1918, CO 533/196.
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6
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Long to Northey, 18
November 1918, CO 533/196.
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7
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Sinclair to
Northey, 13 September 1919, CO 533/214.
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8
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Ibid.
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9
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Ibid.
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10
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Northey to Milner,
31 October 1919, CO 533/214.
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11
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Maxon, East Africa, 131.International Journal of Humanities
and Social Science Vol. 1
No. 20; December 2011
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178
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By another treaty
arrangement with the sultan of Zanzibar,
the British government was allowed to administer the
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10 miles coastal
strip on condition that the government in EAP would pay £6,000 as interest
for the £200,000 paid
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to Imperial British
East Africa Company for the company assets in the sultanates Zanzibar by 1895 plus
£11,000
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being annuity
previously paid by the company. In total the government was required to pay
£17,000 to the Sultan
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of Zanzibar.
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12
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Unfortunately, the
10 miles coastal strip was not clearly delimited, and the treaty remained a
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thorny issue when
deliberating the status of Africans residing in the controversial area. Even
at the time it was
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noted by Bottomley
that it was difficult to determine “who British subjects were and which the
sultan’s were.”
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13
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The annexation was
officially issued on 11 June 1920 when the Order-In-Council was passed,
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14
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but the
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Legislative Council
in the EAP was supposed to ratify it. Accordingly, when Northey returned to
the protectorate
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he announced the
annexation of the EAP during a Legislative Council session on 9 July 1920.
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15
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He told the
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councillors that
the annexation was passed to enable the colony raise cheap development funds
to construct the
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Uasin Gishu
railway, Kilindini harbour and the Thika railway extension. Thus, Northey,
observed:
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We shall now be
able to float a loan for the development of the country. I anticipate
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roughly that we
shall require £2,000,000 for Plateau railway, £500,000 for Thika
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extension,
£1,000,000 for Kilindini harbour.
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16
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The name, Colony
and Protectorate of Kenya,
remained unquestioned until 1960 when discussions started on the
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future independence
of Kenya.
The Arabs within ten Mile coastal strip waged a protracted struggle to pull
out and
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join Sultanate of Zanzibar or form a self
governing Mwambao territory. In an attempt to seek compromise
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between the coastal
inhabitants, a joint commission under Sir James Robertson was put in place to
seek views on
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the future of the
ten miles coastal strip.
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THE GENESIS OF THE
LAND QUESTION AT THE COAST
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A protracted debate
has been ranging on the legitimate owners of land within the ten miles
coastal strip. The
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earliest documents
demonstrate that Africans inhabited the region. The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea written
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around 100 AD by
anonymous writer mentions the inhabitants of the region as men who were black
and of great
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stature ruled by
chiefs.
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17
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They also used
wicker baskets to fish. These inhabitants traded with merchants from
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Mediterranean
world, Persia, Oman, India
and China.
These were probably the proto Swahili. There is no doubt
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that the Swahili
controlled the coast before Arabs settled in the area. It would seem the
conquest of the coast by
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the Portuguese from
1500 and the ruthless administration they established was very un popular
with East Africans
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and was the main
cause for the Swahili to enter into a marriage of convenience with the Oman
Arabs.
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In 1660 Swahili
sent a delegation to Muscat the headquarters
of Oman
leadership seeking military support to raid
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the coast of the
Christian presence. The delegation was led by Mwinyi Nguti, Mwinyi Mole bin
Haji, Mwinyi
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Ndao bin Haji,
Motomato wa Mtorogo and Kubo wa Mwamzungu but the sultan refused to assist.
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18
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A second
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delegation was sent
in 1729 and was able to convince the sultan to offer military assistance. It
was this military
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assistance that
routed the Portuguese out of East Africa in 1798 after a series of battles
over Mombasa.
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19
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Later
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sultan Said Seyyid
transferred his headquarters from Muscat to Zanzibar in 1856 which
enabled him and his
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descendants to have
full political control over East African coast.
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20
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The colonial
domination created by the Arabs
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at the coast made
various European powers to enter into various treaties with the sultan for
they assumed he was
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the master of all
inhabitants of the coast. It was on this assumption that the British and the
Germans decided to set
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aside the ten mile
coastal strip for the sultan of Zanzibar.
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12 William
MacGregor Ross, Kenya
From Within (London: Frank Cass, 1927), 30.
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13
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Minute by
Bottomley, 23 October 1918, CO 533/196.
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14
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Milner to Bowring,
telegram, 23 June 1920, CO 533/240.
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15
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East African
Standard, 10 July 1920.
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16
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Ibid.
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17
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Robert O. Collins,
Eastern Africa: VOL. II of African History, Text and Readings
(New York:
Markus Wiener Publishing,
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1990), 48-49.
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18
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Amos Kareith,
“revisiting ten-mile strip controversy,” The Standard, September 30, 2007.
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19
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Maxon, East Africa, 46-50.
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20
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Ibid., 113-117.The
Special Issue on Contemporary Research in Social Science © Centre for
Promoting Ideas, USA
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179
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The Germans later
paid £200,000 to the sultan as compensation for the control of the coastline
adjacent to their
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German
East Africa.
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21
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The British on
their part they opted to pay an annual rent of £17,000 to the sultan of
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Zanzibar. It was this political arrangement that
made the Arabs at the coast to claim autonomy once it was clear to
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them that the
British were about to grant independence to African nationalists.
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LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE AND TEN MILE COASTAL
STRIP
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The first Lancaster House Conference on the independence of Kenya
opened the Pandora’s Box in as far as
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coastal strip was
concerned. Consequently, during the second Lancaster Conference there were two
parallel
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conferences, one on
colony and the other on the protectorate. The protectorate which covered the
ten miles coastal
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strip was
represented by Arabs, but Jomo Kenyatta and Ronald Ngala and a few other
African delegates attended
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the deliberations
of both conferences. The Arabs wanted the ten miles coastal strip to either
be given autonomy or
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secede to join the
sultanate of Zanzibar instead of being incorporated in independent Kenya.
Sheikh Salim
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Muhaahamy submitted
that:
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The Arab community
would not regard their rights and interests as being adequately
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protected if the
government of the protectorate were ceded to a Kenya government
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responsible to
Kenyan electorate.
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22
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Their observation
was that if Her Majesty’s Government was to cede the territory to Kenya
it would be a breach
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of faith entrusted
on them by 1895 agreement. The African elected leaders led by Ngala were of
the view that the
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coastal strip was
rightfully African territory and should be part and parcel of independent Kenya.
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23
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In fact, Oginga
|
Odinga wanted the
1895 agreement between the sultan of Zanzibar
to be declared null and void.
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24
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Tom Mboya
|
was even more
candid and proposed that those Arabs that were not ready to join Independent Kenya
were free to
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go back to Arabia.
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25
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It was due to this
conflicting positions presented by Africans and Arabs at the conference that
|
made the British
government and the sultanate of Zanzibar
to appoint Sir James Robertson, the former governor
|
of Nigeria
to head a joint commission to inquire on the future of the ten miles coastal
strip in 1961.
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Nevertheless, the
appointment of a commission did not end the conflict. The debate continued in
Kenyan
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Legislative Council
(LegCo) and among the various political parties formed after the first Lancaster Conference
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on the future of
Mwambao. While African political parties; Kenya
African National Union (KANU) and Kenya
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African Democratic
Union (KADU) supported integration of the coastal strip, the Arabs formed
Mwambao
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United Front to
further their political interests. No wonder O. S. Bassaddiq argued that the
“the coastal strip is not
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a part of Kenya and has only been linked with Kenya
for the convenience of the administrators.”
|
26
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However,
|
Jomo Kenyatta
countered such claims by declaring that:
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Kenya is one and nobody can remove any part of
it without encroaching seriously on our
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present nation. Any
move to separate the strip from the reminder of the colony would be
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resisted without
reservation by our people.
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27
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Sir JAMES
ROBERTSON’S REPORT
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Robertson’
commission received presentations from Africans and Arabs and made important
observations. First,
|
the autonomy of the
coastline was complicated by Mombasa being the
chief port serving not only Kenya
but
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Uganda, the great
lakes region, Sudan and
Northern Eastern Tanzania.
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28
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Furthermore, the
development of the port
|
was financed by
loans paid by subjects of Kenya
and could not be controlled by a small part of the country.
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Second, the ten
mile coastal strip was always administered as part of Kenya and the boundaries of the
coastal strip
|
have never been
marked nor observed by the British administrators.
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|
21
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Colonial Office:
The Kenya Coastal Strip:
Report of Commissioner, Cmnd 1585 (London:
Her Majesty’s Stationary
|
Office, 1961), 31.
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22
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The Times of London, January 29,
1960.
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23
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East African
Standard, March 9, 1962. East African Standard, March 10, 1962.
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24
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The Times of London, January 20,
1960.
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25
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The Times of London, June 2, 1961.
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26
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East African
Standard, March 9, 1962.
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27
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Ibid.
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28
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Colonial Office:
Report of the Commissioner, presented to Parliament by Secretary of State for
Colonies by command of
|
Her Majesty,
December 1961.Cmnd 1585. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office,
1961).International Journal of Humanities and Social Science
Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
|
180
|
The incorporation
of the coastline into independent Kenya would not cause any
administrative problem. However,
|
its secession would
make Kenya
a landlocked country. The report noted that the sultan’s sovereignty,
although
|
not in doubt, was
nominal, but was emotionally a fact that could not be ignored despite the
fact that the only
|
manifestation of
his authority was the flag which flew everywhere in the strip.
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Third, it was noted
that the protectorate government continued to pay annual lease of £1700 a
year as
|
compensation and
therefore the British government should pay some money to compensate the
sultan for the loss
|
of revenue.
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Fourth, the Arab
population was a minority at the coast and its autonomy would not make any
economic sense.
|
African in the
coastal strip had asked for integration with the rest of Kenya.
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Fifth, the sultan
had no objection to incorporation of the coastal strip as long as some
safeguards were put in place
|
to protect the
interests of the subjects, allow Islamic traditions and education to continue
and guarantee of land
|
titles for Arabs.
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ROBERTSON’S
RECOMMENDATIONS
|
In view of the
varied presentations, Sir James Robertson recommended that:
|
(1) Muslim law,
religion and education should be incorporated in the Kenyan constitution,
which later
|
became the basis of
establishing the Kadhi’s Courts in Kenya.
|
(2) The strip
should be integrated with Kenya
before independence and that the 1895 agreement should be
|
abrogated.
|
(3) Proposed
retention of Arab administrative officers; the Liwalis and Mudirs at the
coast to ensure Muslim
|
traditions are
observed.
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(4) Recommended
that land titles should be acknowledged and guaranteed. This could be
safeguarded by
|
creating Coast Land Board with executive and advisory
roles to handle land disputes, its disposal and
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transfer of titles.
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(5) He recommended
that the sultan should be paid compensation of £675,000 by the British government
for
|
agreeing to forfeit
his claim over the coastal strip. The government should also pay £400,000 for
the
|
£200,000, plus
interest loaned by the sultan after the Germans bought their section of ten
mile coastal
|
strip from the
sultan but the money was banked in London.
|
These
recommendations were presented to British Parliament by Secretary of State
for colonies (S of S) in
|
December 1961. The
document became part of discussion items during the second Lancaster House Conference in
|
1962.During the
conference the Queen’s Counsel Dingle Foot represented the sultan of Zanzibar and emphasized
|
that the sultan’s
desire was to have an agreement that would take into consideration the
welfare of the coast
|
peoples.
|
29
|
Thus, the Kenyan
leaders were required to show good will and commitment in protecting the
rights of
|
the sultanates
subjects so as to end fear and suspicion on the part of the Arabs. As a
demonstration of this good
|
will, Jomo Kenyatta
signed two agreements; one with the Prime Minister of Zanzibar on 5
|
th
|
October, 1963. The
|
second agreement
was between Kenyatta the Secretary of State for Colonies, Prime minister of Zanzibar and the
|
sultan on 8
|
th
|
October, 1963.
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KENYATTA AGREEMENT
WITH PRIME MINISTER OF ZANZIBAR
|
The agreement was signed in London on 5
|
th
|
October, 1963 and
Kenyatta placed on record the following
|
undertakings by the
government of Kenya.
|
30
|
(1) That free
exercise of any creed or religion will at all times be safeguarded and, in
particular, His
|
Highness’s present
subjects who are the Muslim faith and their descendants will at all times be
ensured of
|
complete freedom of
worship and the preservation of their own religious buildings and
institutions
|
(2) The
jurisdiction of Chief Kadhis will at all times be preserved and will be
extended to the determination
|
of questions of
Muslim law relating to personal status in the proceedings in which all
parties profess the
|
Muslim religion
|
|
29
|
East
Africa Standard, March
12, 1962. Also East African Standard, March 14, 1962.
|
30
|
The agreements are
presented as appendix to presentation in British Parliament by Secretary of
State for Colonies in
|
October 1963. Kenya Coastal Strip: Agreement between the
Government of the United
Kingdom, His Highness the Sultan of
|
Zanzibar, the Government of Kenya and the Government of Zanzibar.
Cmnd. 2161.(London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1963).The Special Issue
on Contemporary Research in Social Science © Centre for
Promoting Ideas, USA
|
181
|
(3) The freehold
titles to land in the coast region that are already registered will at all
times be recognized,
|
steps will be taken
to ensure the continuation of the procedure for the registration of new
freehold titles
|
and rights of
freeholders will at all times be preserved save for so far as it may be
necessary to acquire
|
freehold land for
public purposes, in which event full and prompt compensation will be paid.
|
This document was
signed by Jomo Kenyatta and Mohammed Shamte, Prime Minister of Zanzibar.
|
As a follow up to
this agreement, on 8
|
th
|
October, 1963 the
two Prime Mnisters and the Sultan of Zanzibar
His
|
Highness Seyyid
Jamshid bin Abdula signed a joint agreement with the S of S for Colonies
Duncan Sandays to
|
revoke 1890 and1895
agreements it was agreed further that:
|
(1) The territories
comprised in the Kenya
protectorate shall cease to form part of His Highness dominions
|
and shall thereupon
form part of Kenya
|
(2) The agreement
of 14
|
th
|
June 1890 in so far
as it applies to those territories and the agreement of 14
|
th
|
December 1895 shall
cease to have effect.
|
OBSERVATION
|
(1) The commitment
by the Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta minimized the fears of the Arabs over
their future
|
stay in Kenya
by reassuring them of their land security at the coast. However, the
commitment ignored
|
the aspirations of
Africans who thought that independence would address centuries of land
dispositions
|
by Arab settlers.
It meant that Africans would continue to be squatters. The coastal
politicians thought
|
that Kenyatta’s
commitment would be revoked once Kenya attained her independence;
Kenyatta had no
|
intension of
revoking it. He actually became a beneficiary for managed to substantial
amount of land
|
within the coastal
strip and other parts of the coast. Apparently, he became like the new sultan
and spent
|
most of his
vacation time at the coast.
|
(2) Further by
accepting to recognize freehold title deeds held by a few Asians overlooked
African traditional
|
land tenure system.
The Miji Kenda continues to have rightful claims over certain sacred Kayas
within
|
the former ten mile
coastal strip, but have no title deeds to support their traditional claims.
Consequently,
|
tourists' hotels
and cottages have been built on some of these sacred places.
|
(3) Additionally,
Kenyatta recognized the concept of willing seller and willing seller.
Consequently, only
|
those with money
could own land within the coastal strip based on the law of supply and
demand. This
|
has led to
exorbitant price for land within the coastal strip especially land adjacent
to the beaches.
|
(4) The land that
did not have title deeds was thereafter declared trust land which the
government exploited to
|
settle both
politically and ethnically correct people. This policy has left many coastal
people landless
|
while upcountry
people own fertile land in the region. No wonder, every election year since
1990 there
|
have been ethnic
conflicts between the coast people and upcountry people who are referred to
as “watu
|
wa bara.”
|
(5) Admittedly, the
thirst to own land at the coast by private developers has led to grapping of
beaches which
|
has denied citizens
the right to enjoy and have access to these natural resources. In normal
circumstances
|
the beaches should
have been retained as public recreational areas like Mama Ngina
Gardens instead of
|
being exclusive
areas for tourists.
|
(6) It is equally
disheartening to observe that international agreements which did not
recognize the rights of
|
the Africans have
continued to affect the Kenyan people fifty years after independence. There
is need to
|
re-examine all
colonial agreements to address adequately historical injustices. The
government should
|
come up with a land
policy that would address these historical injustices without creating new
ones. The
|
policy should
address land use, protection of wetlands and environment in general for the
future
|
generations.
|
CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATION
|
From the fore going
discussion it is apparent that the question of historical injustices is a
very complex matter. It
|
is noted that the
land question at the coast pre dates British colonization. The British
accepted the status quo and
|
also the post
colonial regimes. However, Africans at the coast still feel that their land
rights have been ignored all
|
this time. On the
other hand, the Arabs who have freehold title deeds have been in the area for
a long time and are
|
citizens of this
country. The solution to the problem is not to ignore it, but to accept that it
is there and should be
|
sorted out. The
remedy is to identify first the land owned by absentee landlords.
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science
Vol. 1 No. 20; December 2011
|
182
|
Then the government
should repossess such land and distribute it to deserving squatters who have
been living and
|
working on such
land for a long time.
|
Secondly, all the
idle land or the one kept for speculative purposes should be repossessed and
distributed to the
|
only the people
willing to develop it for the well being of the people of Kenya. This policy should be
applied in
|
all parts of the
country. Before land title is granted there should be a development plan to
prove that the applicant
|
would adequately develop
it.
|
Third, land already
conserved as kayas and other areas of public interest should be gazetted as
national
|
monuments and
protected to thwart foreign hunger for land to construct tourist hotels and
cottages.
|
Finally, the
problem faced by people in coast province is failure by the government to
review some draconian
|
colonial agreements
that do not serve the welfare of the people of Kenya. The government should be
bold enough
|
to put its foot
down to address land situation in the country for the benefit of all
inhabitants. It should be
|
emphasized that it
is not a must that every individual should have a share of a small piece of
land. It is the high
|
time that Kenyans
considered land planning and utilization seriously.
|
KIRK FRANKLIN: It's weird because you're talking about the dude who was the minister of music at a church when I was 11. I have to check myself because there's an anger that rises up in me. I get evangelically ticked off by the fact that I wished somebody would have taught me a long time ago about the repercussions of sex and flesh and lust and vanity and pride and ego. I wished somebody would have been holding my little behind accountable years ago. But let me tell you what happens to the gifted. The gifted in the church slip right through.
